In 1996, Kyrgyzstan signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship with Uzbekistan. At that time, many observers predicted that such friendship would grow in strength. Kyrgyz diplomats saw Uzbekistan as a natural ally because of their common past and present challenges. Kyrgyz statesmen also saw Uzbekistan as a reliable partner in resisting pressure from their formidable neighbor, China.

Ironically, in the years that followed, China turned out to be the more reliable and predictable partner for Kyrgyzstan, while the “eternal friendship” with Uzbekistan saw cracks form right after the signing of the 1996 document. The period of initial cooperation gave way to a protracted period of tension, and even to episodes of outright hostility. Against this backdrop, it became evident that few Kyrgyz diplomats possessed the necessary expertise and knowledge about Uzbekistan, or the environment in which its political elites operate. The same was true of Uzbek foreign policy makers.

Perhaps the greatest strain on relations was presented by the difference in strategies for economic and political development chosen by each country. While Kyrgyzstan chose a path of decentralization and liberal economic reform, Uzbekistan pursued a policy of economic protectionism and centralization of power in the hands of a single ruler. While Kyrgyzstan’s leaders committed themselves to democratic reforms, their Uzbek counterparts embarked on building a strong state that soon turned into a dictatorship.

The difference in symbolic meaning between the mythical birds that appear on the Uzbek and Kyrgyz state emblems, Semurg (epitomizing national Renaissance) and Manas’ White Falcon (epitomizing a yearning for freedom), is perhaps representative of the prevailing values in society and differing trajectories of development. While the country of Semurg puts statehood above individual liberties and freedoms, the country of the White Falcon can go as far as to undermine its statehood when the ideals of freedom are at stake. Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revolution of March and Uzbekistan’s Andijan events in May, 2005  amply demonstrated this difference once again.

Despite differing attitudes to the issues of statehood and democratization, with resulting ideological preferences, the necessity for a long-term, mutually-beneficial relationship will always remain a key issue on the agendas of both countries. Despite its importance, Uzbekistan has not been in Kyrgyzstan`s top foreign priority agenda. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan`s policy toward Uzbekistan is characterized by inconsistencies and lack of transparency. Current policy attitudes on Uzbekistan seem to be determined mainly by spontaneously emerging needs of policy-makers to react in some way to numerous hindrances they face in bilateral relations.

This paper examines current problems and challenges in bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It also analyzes the institutional environments in which policy-makers in both countries operate and obtstacles they face. Given all risks and difficulties in bilateral relations, the paper argues that policy-makers in both countries should have realistic expectations from each other. Confidence building measures and the policy of cautious incrementalism has to shape not only official forein policy doctrines but also public policy attitudes.  

Bilateral issues and mutual public perceptions

Following the 1996 agreement, several keystone events had a dramatic impact on public perceptions in Kyrgyzstan about Uzbekistan: the incursion of the Batken province by a group of Islamic militants in 1999 and 2000, the border delimitation crisis of 1999, the unsuccessful attempt by the two countries to swap enclave-surrounding territories in 2001, the introduction of a visa regime in 2000 and the Andijan events of 2005. Among the recurring issues that affect Kyrgyz public’s perceptions of Uzbekistan are the annual negotiations on Uzbek gas and fuel as well as talks on water and energy regulation. These issues have usually resulted in a negative imagery of Uzbekistan. Recurring border incidents which include landmine explosions, shootings,  and physical assault of civilians by border troops of both countries have added to the atmosphere of tension.

Some  positive events that Kyrgyzstani public associates with Uzbekistan include the signing of the Treaty on Eternal Friendship, Kyrgyz-Uzbek negotiations in multilateral institutions (SCO, CIS, Evrazes), material support from Tashkent that came right after the March events in 2005, and the infrequent Uzbekistani concessions to Kyrgyzstan related to the supplies of Uzbek gas.

While events played a key role, three key issues have dominated the agenda in bilateral relations. The first is related to border demarcation. The first is related to border demarcation. The second problematic area is natural resources and their management. The third problem area involves political issues. Each of these deserves particular attention because it has the potential to impact the dynamics of future relations.

Troubles at the borders

Uzbekistan’s economic policies, which favored protectionism and closed markets, prompted the Uzbek authorities to reinforce their borders with all their Central Asian neighbors. In 2000, Uzbekistan imposed a visa regime that applied to the citizens of Kyrgyzstan. While residents of southern Kyrgyzstan are allowed to travel up to 100 kilometers into Uzbekistan or to transit this territory, more extensive travel (such as to Tashkent) requires a visa. Kyrgyzstan responded by instituting a similar visa regime.

These restrictions disrupted traditional patterns of trade and social interaction in the Ferghana Valley. The rich cultural exchange that characterized the region for centuries has become minimal. The fact that neither country maintains a consulate in any of the border cities is a source of frustration for many residents. For example, according to this arrangement, residents of Osh, five kilometers from the Uzbek border, need to travel 600 kilometers north to the capital, Bishkek, in order to receive a visa for travel within Uzbekistan. Similarly, residents of Andijan need to obtain a visa in the Kyrgyz embassy in Tashkent, which is 350 kilometers away.

Following bomb blasts in Tashkent in February 1999, Uzbekistan fortified the borders in the Ferghana Valley as a security measure. Attacks by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) during the summers of 1999 and 2000 pushed Uzbekistan to take strong steps again. In August 1999, the Uzbek Air Force launched air strikes against alleged IMU positions in southern Kyrgyzstan, reportedly without the consent of the Kyrgyz government. Similarly, the Uzbek security services operated on Kyrgyz territory to capture suspected Islamic extremists. These activities caused public outcry in Kyrgyzstan and contributed to poor relations along the border.

Other problematic areas also caused concern for Kyrgyzstani citizens. Territorial disputes and the process of border demarcation have long been sources of friction between the two countries. Joint work to demarcate the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border began in February 2000, but has proceeded very slowly. According to the International Crisis Group, by February 2002 only 209 out of 1,400 kilometers had been jointly demarcated, although 994 kilometers had been studied. The most contentious points are the 406 kilometers in Osh and Batken regions, which are still being studied by the joint commission.

Another problematic aspect of the border delimitation process is unilateral demarcation attempts and the mining of borders. There have been cases of unsanctioned seizure of land by local communities living in villages adjacent to the borders. In 1999, the Uzbek border guards began planting landmines on territories that are regarded as disputed. The move, which was originally designed to thwart the infiltration of Islamic militants, ended up causing numerous civilian casualties. Since 1999, more than a dozen Kyrgyzstani citizens as well as tens of Uzbekistani citizens became victims of mine explosions. Under international pressure, Uzbekistan began removing the landmines. However, there are claims in the Kyrgyz press that some areas along the border have not been completely cleared of mines.

There are numerous press reports that depict widespread practices of harassment, extortion and even attacks by the border troops of both countries on ordinary travelers. In recent years, incidents have been reported of border troopers opening fire on civilians without a particular reason.

The Resources Curse

Two commodities - water and energy - have long served as a source of tension. Uzbekistan is a major supplier of natural gas to Kyrgyz consumers. Kyrgyzstan controls the water supply to Uzbekistan, especially its Ferghana Valley provinces. For several consecutive years, the Uzbek suppliers of natural gas cut off the gas supply to Kyrgyzstan, claiming that Kyrgyzstan has a large outstanding debt. Kyrgyz officials claimed that the Uzbeks have not paid for  water. Uzbek officials claim that water is a freely available natural resource, and that the Kyrgyz should not charge money for it.  Both parties often refer to a barter agreement signed in 1998.

According to local experts, a major problem with this barter agreement is that it did not take into account the seasonal need of commodities. Kyrgyzstan is in great need of energy supplies in the cold winter months. It is not in much need of energy in the late spring or early summer – the very time when the downstream countries need water for irrigation. As frequently happens, when Kyrgyzstan is not convinced that enough gas, coal and mazut will be provided by Uzbekistan in winter, it protects itself by producing more electricity – thus dumping its water reservoirs in the winter months.

The large amounts of water released cause the lakes to flood. Up to 350,000 hectares of land in Navoi and Jizzak Provinces have been flooded, and farms in Namangan Province are under threat. Roads and electricity lines have also been badly hit by floods. According to a January 2002 Uzbek State Channel broadcast, officials have estimated the total damage inflicted upon Uzbekistan at US$ 770 million. Some Uzbekistani officials threatened to take Kyrgyzstan to the International Court of Justice.

Uzbekistan has reportedly used Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on Uzbek gas to pressure it into concessions on political issues as well. For example, when Uzbekistan cut off gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan in 2001, the Kyrgyz press linked it with the Uzbek desire to compel Kyrgyzstan’s compliance with territorial demands and claims for land corridors to Uzbek enclaves.

Political antagonism

Cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is additionally hampered by differences in the way the two states are governed. The more open society in Kyrgyzstan presents a challenge to President Karimov. In Uzbekistan, the media and dissemination of information are tightly controlled, and there is little political pluralism. Puppet political parties have been set up by the regime to create an image of a democratic process. Open discussions on policies and policy outcomes, which were tolerated to a certain degree in the early 1990s, have become rare in Uzbekistan. According to the IPP’s numerous informal interviews with Uzbek officials, the desire “to please the boss” prompts many officials at the local levels to control and limit the supply of information to the upper echelons of power.

Although data on Uzbekistan’s process of forming policy, especially foreign policy, is sketchy, what is known is that policy-making is highly centralized. At the apex of policy-formation is President Islam Karimov. As described below, his personal preferences determine the general course of foreign policy process. President Karimov’s administration is the dominant force within the policy-formation system. Within the administration, the state advisers to the President play a crucial role as gatekeepers to the President when deciding on foreign policy options. Based on official press statements and interviews, many high-ranking officials tend to rely on the National Security Service for data and information about neighboring countries, rather than on foreign policy institutions.

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, matters dealing with Kyrgyzstan have long been assigned to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) desk. Now the desk on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also deals with some of these matters. Other governmental agencies, such as Uzbekistan’s National Gas Company and the Ministry of Agriculture, contribute to policy formation, but they do not play a dominant role. As one Kyrgyz negotiator observed, Uzbek negotiators often cannot decide on even simple matters during bilateral negotiations on borders without referring back to Tashkent. The oblast (district) and rayon (region) administrations, which border Kyrgyzstan, are the least significant actors, despite the fact that they have a direct impact on policies imposed from the center.

Although Uzbek officials claim that national interests drive Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, they have so far not been able to clearly formulate these interests. Rather, ideology, particularly President Karimov’s pronouncement that “Uzbekistan’s Future is as a Great State,” has long been the most salient aspect of the Uzbek foreign policy. Behind this ideological pronouncement, some Kyrgyz observers see hidden expansionist tendencies of Uzbekistan.

Against this backdrop, President Karimov’s statements sometimes add fuel to the fire of distrust. In a February 1999 radio interview, President Karimov accused Akaev of being unable to “do much of anything apart from smile.” This statement set public opinion in Kyrgyzstan against Uzbekistan. Kyrgyz parliamentary deputies demanded that cooperation with Uzbekistan be reduced and measures be taken to defend the dignity of the country. Some deputies in Kyrgyzstan were infuriated by former President Askar Akaev’s refusal to stand up to Karimov’s abuse, and were further annoyed by his reluctance to use Kyrgyzstan’s leverage as a supplier of water to Uzbekistan. 

In the fall of 2000, in the run up to the Kyrgyz presidential election, relations between the two presidents warmed a bit. In keeping with personalized foreign policy, President Karimov flew to Bishkek to personally support President Akaev. “If I were an ordinary Kyrgyz citizen, I would definitely vote for my friend Askar Akaev,” Karimov told Kyrgyz journalists at a press conference. This statement was widely and cynically seen in Kyrgyzstan as a utilitarian move to strengthen Akaev’s candidacy, because Karimov could boss him around more easily than another potential president. Observers suggested that Karimov did not want a new Kyrgyz leader who would have been able to stand up to him.

After this brief episode, relations turned sour again. Uzbekistan continued to blame Kyrgyzstan for lenient treatment of “Islamic extremists” in the Ferghana Valley. Following the incursions of Islamic militants in 2000 and the Andijan uprising in May 2005, the Uzbek official press claimed that “terrorists” have established training bases in Kyrgyzstan and used them to attack government buildings in Uzbekistan. In demanding the extradition of several hundred Uzbek citizens who found refuge in Kyrgyzstan’s Jalalabad region, Uzbekistan effectively accused Kyrgyzstan of “harboring terrorists.”

While bilateral relations have been charachterized by tension and even hostility, the cooperation of the  two countries within multilateral organizations has been remarkably progressive.

Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations within multilateral regional organizations

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan’s relations within multilateral institutions have been most prominent in two organizations, the CIS and SCO. Paradoxically, within the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS), Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have put the most emphasis on free trade, economic integration, and cooperation, which obviously contradicts the real state of bilateral relations.

More productive efforts at cooperation are noticeable within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have jointly pushed at least one serious initiative, that of questioning the further necessity of the American airbases in Khanabad and Manas. While Uzbekistan was swift to rid itself of the American airbase, Kyrgyz officials are using softer, financially augmented tools to wedge out the Americans. In 2003, Uzbekistan lobbied for moving the SCO Regional Antiterrorism Center from Bishkek to Tashkent, and positioned itself as the military powerhouse of Central Asia.

Uzbekistan was also part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that unites Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia, but left in 1999, following its independent, anti-Russian posture. Yet, due to the Uzbek-Russian rapprochement following Andijan, talks are currently underway on Uzbekistan re-joining this organization. According to CSTO agreements, Kyrgyzstan hosts a military airbase in Kant, which was previously viewed with suspicion by Tashkent. Uzbekistan may also agree to host a Russian airbase instead of American troops in Khanabad.    

Since 2002, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have been part of the Organization for Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC). Despite a number of promising head starts, real cooperation within this organization’s framework has been hardly noticeable.

On June 13, 2006, the Kyrgyz parliament ratified Uzbekistan’s joining of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). In October 2005, Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining the EEC, promising that it would implement all EEC rules and procedures immediately after joining. Yet, as of June 2006, there were concerns that Uzbekistan was delaying the implementation of some customs and tariffs regulations.

Leaders’ interest in cooperation or avoidance of cooperation is influenced by a set of assumptions they hold about each other. We now turn to these. 

Public assumptions that affect the foreign policies of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan towards each other

It is important to understand the assumptions of Uzbek policy makers that affect foreign policy towards Kyrgyzstan. It is equally important to distinguish elite assumptions from popular assumptions. Based on numerous informal interviews with Uzbek officials and citizens, the following general assumptions are discernible:

Elite assumptions

Kyrgyzstan is politically and militarily weak state.  A small country the size of two of Uzbekistan’s provinces in population, it is also a hotbed of political and economic problems. Several episodes support this assumption. The first is related to Kyrgyzstan’s handling of the Batken crisis, in which a group of Islamic militants were able to infiltrate Kyrgyz territory without difficulty and succeeded in securing a ransom for some hostages. The second is related to the numerous protests that are allowed within the country, and which led up to the Tulip Revolution. In the view of Uzbek officials, President Akaev’s weakness and inability to take a tough military stand on opposition led to his demise and to dangerous spillover effects in Uzbekistan.

Kyrgyzstan is a source of constant irritation. Its liberal economic policy, namely its joining the World Trade Organization, is viewed as dangerous to Uzbekistan’s closed market and protectionist system. Kyrgyzstan is a source of natural resources, namely water and electricity. In the view of Uzbek officials, Kyrgyz officials are difficult to negotiate with, and do not always respect the clauses of agreements. What is particularly irritating in the view of Tashkent is that Kyrgyzstan insists on regarding water flows as a natural commodity for sale, and wants lowland countries to compensate for water management costs.

It is important to note that the Uzbek authorities are trying to inculcate these perceptions among their citizens through state media broadcasts and publications.

However, popular perceptions of Kyrgyzstan differ from those of the political elite. In the views of many ordinary people, especially in the Ferghana Valley, Kyrgyzstan is an economically dynamic and politically open society that tolerates opposition in many forms. Historically nomadic, the Kyrgyz have been able to achieve remarkable economic progress because of their closer ties to the international community and liberal economic policies.

As one Uzbek journalist in exile told the IPP, “Karasuu market in Kyrgyzstan is visited by traders from all regions of Uzbekistan. They see that Kyrgyzstan has far less police officers and tax inspectors on the streets, but that people seem to live better despite this fact. Not a single road police station stopped us on the longest Osh-Bishkek highway. Contrary to Karimov’s statements, Kyrgyzstan gives an example of how an “Eastern” country can adopt liberal policies without harm.”

These perceptions prompt many ordinary Uzbek labor migrants to cross the borders daily in search of better pay. Uzbek traders smuggle goods to Kyrgyzstan to get better prices. In recent years, many ordinary believers in Islam from Uzbekistan have found refuge in Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions, fleeing persecution and torture in Uzbekistan. The flight of Andijan refugees to Kyrgyzstan is the latest episode.

Assumptions and myths guide not only the people in Uzbekistan, but also in Kyrgyzstan. From the early nineties onward, for part of the Kyrgyz public, especially in the south of the country, Uzbekistan’s image has been that of a highly orderly and stable country, which has managed to maintain a Soviet-era social welfare system and economic infrastructure.

An average man would bring up the examples that, apparently, captured car thieves in Tashkent are immediately sentenced to capital punishment, and that in years with good cotton harvests, common farmers can easily buy Korean and Uzbek-made cars. President Islam Karimov was seen as a strong and tough leader, able to keep Uzbekistan from delving into chaos and disorder.

At the same time, many ordinary Kyrgyz citizens have become practically acquainted with the toughness of Karimov’s regime in a number of areas, including trans-border movements, trade, visa issues and so on, which effectively damaged Uzbekistan’s positive imagery. The Andijan events in May 2005 further exposed the full depth of social tension and internal political issues in Uzbekistan.

Constant coverage by Kyrgyz media outlets of the problematic areas in relations with Uzbekistan has formed a predominantly negative image of this country. The filtered official information coming out of Uzbekistan cannot compete with alternative coverage and reports, both from within the country and by foreign media outlets. Uzbekistan is now largely seen as a source of constant tension that represents a latent political, social, and even military threat to Kyrgyzstan.

The wider Kyrgyz public has traditionally been discontent with the strict posture that Uzbekistan takes on many bilateral issues. Kyrgyzstan has always felt strong pressure from Uzbekistan in such issues as Uzbek refugees in Kyrgyzstan, border issues, gas supplies and water management.

Among the popular attitudes held in Kyrgyzstan about Uzbekistan are following:

Uzbekistan is pursuing expansionist goals. Towards that goal, Uzbekistan is pursuing the policy of repatriating co-ethnics, similar to Russia’s compatriots policy. Uzbekistan’s ultimate goal is to carve out parts of the southern region of Kyrgyzstan, namely Osh and Jalal-Abad oblasts, which have sizable ethnic Uzbek populations.

Uzbekistan is bankrolling some Uzbek leaders in south Kyrgyzstan to promote Uzbekistan’s interests. The latest demands in Jalal-Abad to give the Uzbek language an official status is viewed as part of this broader agenda. Plus, Uzbekistan has never allowed the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan out of its informational media environment, with an unprecedented volume of Tashkent’s media influence being exerted in southern Kyrgyzstan.

Uzbekistan retains an indirect, “soft power” influence over Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uzbek minority. Uzbekistan’s TV and radio channels cover the whole of southern Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek political and cultural broadcasts have a significant impact on the political thinking of ethnic Uzbeks. For example, according to Morgan Liu, an anthropologist at Harvard University, in the late 1990s many ethnic Uzbek men in Osh had had a positive image of President Islam Karimov as a strong ruler, a Central Asian khan.

Uzbekistan will not hesitate to use military force to solve some bilateral issues. Many observers point at the 1999 bombing of Kyrgyz territory by Uzbek fighter planes that were supposedly targeting Islamic militants.

The fact that Uzbekistan is militarily more powerful than all other Central Asian states further strengthens the suspicion of Kyrgyz policy-makers. According to the UK-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, including reserves, the Uzbek military force stands at almost 130,000 men. Active forces amount to some 80,000 – 50,000 in the Army, 9,100 in the Air Force, 18,000 in Ministry of the Interior units, and 1,000 in the National Guard. Manpower fit for service is estimated at about 5 million people. Following the Andijan crackdown, there are reports that Uzbekistan is further modernizing its military.

These perceptions are widespread throughout Kyrgyzstan. Some officials, particularly at the local levels, believe that they are credible. However, scrutiny of empirical reality disproves these myths. First, Uzbekistan has not pursued a co-ethnic policy at all similar to the Russian compatriots policy. In fact, the Uzbek leadership in Tashkent has long viewed the ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with suspicion. Uzbek state TV channels have claimed that the Islamic militants that targeted Uzbekistan in 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005, were ethnic Uzbeks – citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Second, a fundamental challenge to Uzbekistani security is derived from the weakness of neighboring states, particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which makes Uzbekistan vulnerable to spillover effects. Uzbekistan has taken steps to isolate itself from Tajikistan’s civil war. Following the 2005 Tulip Revolution, Uzbekistan strove to limit the spillover impact. There are also concerns about the possible repetition of the outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence which occurred in 1990 between Uzbek and Kyrgyz inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan’s southern territories. Such violence could spark inter-ethnic and inter-state confrontations in the heart of the Ferghana Valley, which runs through these three countries. Uzbekistan, which is home to many ethnic minority groups, including Tajiks, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, is not interested in promoting the rights of co-ethnics precisely because of its bad treatment of its own ethnic minority groups and its fear of retaliatory co-ethnics policies by Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and even Turkmen.

Another angle of the issue comes from the fact that, according to the Kyrgyz Ministry of National Security, more than 90% of the membership of the Islamic party Hizb-ut-Takhrir in Kyrgyzstan is ethnically Uzbek. As a result, religious persecution in Uzbekistan and the Hizb-ut-Takhrir issue have allowed for unusual cooperation between Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani security forces in hunting down “religious fundamentalists.” Kyrgyzstan has long tolerated incursions of Uzbek security forces into Kyrgyz territory to arrest and detain Uzbeks with Kyrgyz citizenship.

Conclusions

Several key factors explain the unpredictable and conflictual nature of relations between the two republics. It is evident that the political elites of the two countries know very little about each other or the environment in which they operate. As a result, they form their policies based on assumptions and myths rather than hard facts.

The relations between the two countries have been markedly personalized. Individual leaders have played a far more predominant role in diplomacy than foreign policy institutions. Consequently, when the political leaders were at odds with each other, the relations between the two countries became sour. When the leaders were on good terms, relations were marked by cooperation.

Many observers view the Treaty of Eternal Friendship between the two countries with cynicism. Regional leaders have disappointed the hopes of their citizens for the development of successful, mutually-beneficial bilateral relations.

Citizens bear the negative results of friction and tension in the relations between the two countries. Border restrictions disrupted the traditional patterns of trade and social interaction in the valley. The rich cultural exchange that characterized the region for centuries has become minimal.

It is evident that these two countries – with fairly high level of interdependence— should develop interest-based and mutually beneficial relations. Current relations driven by personal preferences, one-sided calculations and unilateral actions, all accompanied with declarations of ‘eternal’ friendship, do not seem to live up to the hopes of population and interests of country leaders.

The governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan should try to use cultural and linguistic closeness and their shared desire to have a stable and peaceful Ferghana valley for the incremental and progressive development of relations . Establishing robust mechanisms and institutions, and resolving issues in a systematic, transparent and pragmatic ways will  help to make the friendship stronger if not eternal.