Muratbek Imanaliev, President of IPP

Eurasia is a space where different processes are taking shape. The CIS is one such process.

The CIS indeed possesses the formal attributes and features of an intergovernmental organization: constitutional instruments, executive bodies, etc. As a matter of fact however, this organization is a regulated process of disintegration of a once enormous country. The CIS did not appear on December 8, 1991 in Belovejskaya Pusha. Actually, the process was triggered earlier, in 1989-1990 when, first in the Baltic Republics, and later in other states, including the RSFSR, people began talking about sovereignty and independence. December 8, 1991 is not so much the birthday of CIS, but rather a point of reference denoting the formalization of the process of disintegration of the empire, regulated in its main fragments. This is where the situation in the USSR differs from that of Yugoslavia.

The CIS was not only a “divorce” process, but also a process of forming relations between the former Soviet Republics in two aspects: first, between Russia and the rest, and second, between the newly independent states themselves that emerged, for example in former soviet Middle Asia[1]. I want to emphasize that these processes, including the divorce process, are yet far from the point of completion; empires do not collapse instantly. I assume that a new stage of the “divorce” process began with the “orange revolutions,” though certain outbursts emerged sporadically earlier as well, often reflected in the statements of the presidents of CIS countries.

Vectors of the development processes in the CIS and the potential appearance of new ones largely depend on Russia, which in a certain sense is a hostage of the CIS within the framework of all these processes. From one side, Russia, having strategic and other interests in all regions and countries of the Commonwealth and bearing historical responsibility for all post-soviet space, does not want to loose control over the “CIS process.” In this case however, Russia needs to move toward serious preferences for other countries of the Commonwealth. From the other side, the “CIS burden” is rather heavy for Moscow, due to multiple internal and external factors. In this context, the space to maneuver is wider for other CIS countries, though with a different amplitude of political and economic discourses and varying volumes. At the same time, it should be admitted that everything does not always depends on other large actors. 

The belt of Muslim countries, from Maghreb to the Heavenly Empire, (over which the USA wants to establish control, having defined it as strategic goal) is another region where a process of a different nature and quality has begun, related to the crisis of religion and accompanied by problems of a political, economic, cultural-humanitarian nature.

In the overall historical context, it is possible to assume that the crisis of Islam, which is reflected in demonstrative ideologization and politicization, will further take it to a new qualitative level of development and dissemination, provided new, internal, positive conditions for reform are created.

Everything connected to processes related to Islam and Muslim countries touches the countries of Central Asia as well, like a large wing. Islamic organizations are gradually becoming increasingly active in this region.

For the Central Asian states (in this case I refer to the former soviet republics), identity is an issue of strategic choice. However, it is not about a choice between the CIS and Islam. In principle, there are no serious collisions or contradictions in the choice between the CIS and Islam. The only problem is extremism: it is possible to be a Muslim country and have friendly relations with Russia and other powers.

With the promulgation of the idea of creating a so-called Big Central Asia, with the start of its implementation moreover, the situation in the region is being “condensed” by this new conceptual-strategic development of the USA.

Indeed, the historical-geographic definition of Central Asia encompasses a vast territorial space, including the former soviet republics of Middle Asia, Afghanistan and other states. In this evaluative construction, there are no divergences in the positions of all participants in the process. However, it is clear that the American initiative is filled with political, economic and other meanings. It is believed to be related to competition between Russia, China and the USA in the Central Asian region. In response to the idea of a Big Central Asia, the president of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbaev, initiated a proposal on the creation of a new Central Asian Union. The Central Asian Union that existed earlier was integrated into EurAzEs. It is obvious that new proposals and concepts will follow.

With the start of the antiterrorist campaign led by the USA in Afghanistan, an alternative space for international cooperation and exit to the world appeared for the Central Asian countries, particularly for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. If peace will indeed be established in Afghanistan, and if the country will start to progress, then a way to South Asia will be opened for the countries of Central Asia, which implies the creation of new opportunities for integration and new potential for trade and economic partnership, particularly for energy-exporting Central Asian countries. Of course, what is expressed in this paragraph is not an immediate prospect, as there are too many problems. Yet, it should be underlined that such a prospect significantly expands the intermediary role of Central Asia, which can bring significant dividends for the countries of this region. This is very clear to the leaders of the Central Asian countries.

On the other hand however, Big Central Asia, as it is understood by the Central Asian countries, is a project under the auspices of the USA. Active implementation of such a project (again as envisaged by these states) can generate concerns in Moscow and Beijing, first of all in notions of geopolitics, of military, political and economic strategy development, and of value guidelines. The latter has significant meaning for the countries of Central Asia. Creation of a Big Central Asia will naturally lead to increased islamization of the countries of the region, and not necessarily in the version of the so called “pure Islam.”  Overall, Islamic values are overt and are perceived positively by everyone, just like the values of other religions. However, the Central Asian states fear that along with “pure Islam,” extremism, terrorism, etc, can come into the region to a larger extent.

Formation of elite groups in the Central Asian countries is proceeding under rather complicated international conditions. Moreover, internal conditions are complicated by many negative factors as well. Obviously, the immature political elites of the Central Asian countries are seriously challenged by the piling up problems within the rather complicated processes developing in the CIS region and the Islamic world, especially when we consider the exacerbating role of competition in the region between the leading powers of the world, who propose (sometimes rather assertively) their own value guidelines.

Immaturity is demonstrated first of all by the imitation of others. It is necessary not to imitate, but to study and learn what is best and useful, which has not yet been achieved. Imitation can lead not only to the construction of a less than ideal copy of any development model, but also to the loss of guidelines in these seething processes. 

Postcommunism, liberalism, Islamism, and nationalism are all represented in the Central Asian states in quasi-value capacities, and all have their followers and apologists.

Big Central Asia or Small Middle Asia? There can be no choice between the two, as it could lead to the division of Central Asia. It is necessary to form an independent, new and endogenous historical process in which the Central Asian states will themselves be the major actors.