Despite the statements of the new leadership, the past year did not become a period of stabilization, and there were no large-scale reforms that might have substantially changed the political landscape of the country. The narrow corporative nature of the March events has brought clear benefits only to a limited group of people. A direct consequence of the narrow range of benefit was not only frustration among ordinary citizens, who were expecting rapid improvement of their conditions, but also frustration felt by many “fathers” of the revolution, who could not realize their ambitious dreams. As a result, the crisis of relationships in the top political structures has come to light by producing confrontation between the legislative and executive branches, together with the participation of the most active members of civil society.

Thus, the period from the second half of 2005 until the first half of 2006 could be characterized as a time in which the opposition formed itself into the state’s new leadership. Its main body is represented by members of parliament, who use clearly-expressed anti-presidential rhetoric in their activities. Their movement, “For Reforms,” along with the representatives of other political parties and movements, form the foundation of the “new old opposition” to the monopoly of presidential power in Kyrgyzstan. The series of protest meetings which were carried out in the spring of 2006, together with the activities announced to take place in the autumn of this year, generate anxious expectations within society. This anxiety is intensified by the unpredictable foreign policy of the country, one of example of which was the crisis in Kyrgyz-U.S. relations in July.

Will these negative expectations be realized? How could they influence our foreign policy? Or, to paraphrase the question: how will foreign policy influence the domestic development of Kyrgyzstan?

These are the questions that concern not only political elites, but also ordinary citizens who are tired of political instability in the country.

An analysis of main the components leads to the assumption that the main tendencies identified in the first half of the year will have a logical continuation in the autumn of 2006.  In practice, it means that the domestic political situation will be characterized by a series of sluggish crises in Government/opposition relations, which are unlikely to result in any large-scale deterioration of the situation. The main intrigue, possibly, will revolve around the discussion of new versions of the Constitution, and, correspondingly, around the decision on the form of the governance.

Among the main factors, which from which such conclusions can be derived, are:

1. Domestic political factors. The determinant among domestic political factors is the lack of constructive democratic opposition in the country, which would be able to come up with real alternatives to the ruling regime.  A simple comparison of political figures who represent the Government and the opposition demonstrates the lack of fundamental differences between them. Specific distinctions only relate to their different positions in the power pyramid, which, in all apparentness, is targeted to be overcome by new opposition leaders. Indirect confirmation of this goal is the behavior by the overwhelming majority of “revolutionists,” who have understood the “people’s revolution of March 2005” as a pardon for absolute power and anarchy.

However, the primary tragedy lies in another factor. Neither the ruling regime nor the opposition have a strategic vision of state’s future that would enable them to develop realizable reform programs; both of them have similar attitudes towards ordinary citizens as the subjects of political manipulation; both the ruling regime and the opposition are hostages of regional-clan constructions that transform the conflict between them from a rational level into one that is both irrational and hardly predictable. The consequence of this transformation is a gradual fall of the prestige of the conflicting parties among ordinary people, which generates a crisis of political leadership and distrust of the authorities in all aspects.

In its turn, the democratic segment of Kyrgyz opposition has always been week and extremely dependent on foreign influence. This opposition is deprived full authority and influence in Kyrgyz society, which functions according to the principles of clan solidarity. In the end, the society becomes more and more unreceptive to the grandiloquent statements of local politicians, which hide banal power struggles.

Among other factors, attention also should be given to the fact that the parliament, which has been trying to play an independent role until recently, is loosing more of that function. Radical opposition is represented by a small group of deputies, who are unable to influence the position of the pro-government majority of deputies. The main threat is in the subordination of parliament, which, by contributing to domestic political stability, in reality strengthens the monopoly of the executive power in the country.

2. Foreign policy factor. This factor is expressed in the preferred support of the ruling authority, both by the Central Asian states, and by more influential foreign actors. In this case, the obvious motive that determines the unconditional support of the ruling authority by foreign actors is the fear of wide-scale internal political destabilization, which could potentially create direct threats to the external environment. Russia is playing the determining role in this case, since both the ruling authority and the opposition have traditionally been directed towards the support of political figures from Moscow. Thus, the success of the March events was in many respects predetermined by the consent of the Kremlin to have contacts with the leaders of the Kyrgyz opposition. At the present time, there are no apparent reasons to suppose that the opposition would be receiving at least morale support from either Russia, or neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Officially, both Moscow and neighboring regional states are extremely interested in maintaining domestic political stability in Kyrgyzstan, with the goal of retaining the previous level of relations and protecting their own economic interests. The question of how this notorious stability will be achieved remains beyond their direct interest.

It is possible to assume that the course of the U.S. administration regarding Kyrgyzstan will be the subject of minor corrections. The upcoming U.S. Congressional Elections will compel the Bush administration to demonstrate high activeness in promoting democratic ideals throughout the world, including in Kyrgyzstan. Of no small importance in this connection is preserving U.S. aspirations to play a dominant role here. This goal will be achieved according to an established scheme, which presumes active contact with both ruling authorities and opposition figures. Despite a clear and unambiguous sign from Bishkek that was vocalized in July of this year, contacts with the opposition will remain valuable for the U.S. as an opportunity to influence directly the domestic political processes. At the same time, the opportunities of foreign policy maneuvering by Washington D.C. have been substantially limited to the presence of the Ganci air base in Bishkek, which is of strategic value to the U.S. Taking into account the interests of both parties in ensuring long-term contacts, future Kyrgyz-U.S. relationships are more likely to be built according to a complex basis of short term conflicts and compromises.

The probable short-term forecast of the country’s foreign policy development could also be constructed on the basis of established tendencies, which allow us to identify several different groups of partners on the basis of their importance for the new Government.

The first group, of course, includes Russia, Kazakhstan, and China. There are supposed to be some political and economic dividends from strengthening the relationships with these countries. Rapprochement with them is furthered by a specific, common approach in domestic politics, and also by the necessity of receiving some support from them on some courses, including the neutralization of opposition. The countries mentioned are also interested in strengthening their long term presence in Kyrgyzstan, each for different reasons. One of the main apparent factors in this regard could be the increasing geopolitical importance of Kyrgyzstan in the system of interregional connections.

The less convenient partners of the second group include the U.S.A and the countries of the European Union. The clear dependence of Kyrgyzstan on financial inflows from outside the region determines the necessity to maintain the same level of relations with them. In its turn, the obvious interest of the U.S. and European Union in Central Asia, and in Kyrgyzstan more specifically, determines the development of relations between them in traditional spheres: democratization, security, and economic cooperation. The factor that complicates relations between Kyrgyzstan and these countries is the issue of democratization and political reform. At the same time, existing experience shows that all parties will continue trying to reach mutually-acceptable solutions with the consideration of their own strategic interests.

The third group includes the countries of the region and Newly Independent States (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), and also some states from far abroad, predominantly from South-Western Asia (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan etc.). Military-technical and economic cooperation will dominate in the relationships with this group.

Thus, it is possible to assume with considerable confidence that the development of the country’s foreign policy will not undergo radical changes in the autumn of this year, but will develop according the trajectory that was given by the previous leadership. At the same time, the obvious change of priorities towards culturally and geographically closer countries allows us to characterize the current stage of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy as an “asymmetric mutli-vector” approach, which is directly conditioned by the tendencies of domestic political development in the country.

The following recommendations are offered, with which to mitigate the acuteness of domestic political crisis in Kyrgyzstan:

1. Development and adoption of a strategic development program for Kyrgyzstan,` with the consideration of the long-term national interests of society and country.

2. Abstention from the use of force in Government/opposition relations, including mediation through the preparation and signing of a social contract by the main political forces – a National Treaty on Unity – which must contain basic, commonly-recognized  principles for democratic transition in the medium-term period.

3. Strengthening the infrastructure of democratic transition in Kyrgyzstan through overcoming the legal nihilism of all citizens without exceptions, as well as increasing the role of political parties and NGOs in the social life of the country.

 4. Increase of transparency in the decision-making of the executive branch on strategic development issues in the areas of domestic and foreign policy.

5. Concentration of efforts by the executive and legislative branches of power in solving the daily problems of population and overcoming the amplifying gap in incomes which creates risks in the internal political development of Kyrgyzstan.

6. Preservation of a multi-vector approach in the foreign policy development of the country through ensuring success in implementing comprehensive reforms, directed toward the all-inclusive modernization of the country.

Nur Omarov, PhD in History, Professor