Struggle against terrorism and religious extremism has lately become a topical issue in Kyrgyzstan, in light of series of special operations of law enforcement agencies in the south of the country. Several alleged militants as well as Imam from the Karasuu Mosque were killed during these operations. On this topic the IPP has interviewed Dr. Aleksey Malashenko, Scholar-in-Residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center, and a well-known specialist on Islam in post-soviet states.

IPP: Dr. Malashenko, the Kyrgyz Security Forces have recently intensified their struggle against religious extremism in southern Kyrgyzstan. In your opinion, how realistic is the threat of religious extremism in Central Asia, and particularly in Kyrgyzstan? 

Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: Such a threat is realistic. Religious extremism is a reactive form of expressing oneself against unsuccessful state policies, state corruption and the general despair of a nation and its population. Islamists have always been popular in these areas, where a secular opposition does not exist. In this respect, the threat of religious extremism is higher in Uzbekistan than in Kyrgyzstan. These Islamist forces are not able to cause a kind of "Green Revolution" single-handedly. In crises situations provoked by other domestic (and international) forces, these religious extremists would be fish in water, supporting certain groups while at the same time, promoting their own strategies. The Islamists' slogans could be easily used both by absolutely secular people and by manipulators and imams intent on leading the masses to Islamic causes. These sorts of things have already taken place inside and outside Kyrgyzstan.

IPP: According to the former Chairman of the National Security Service, Busurmankul Tabaldiev, religious extremists had declared jihad against Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies after its series of special operations. Should we expect a long-term escalation of conflict?

Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: We will see. A declaration of jihad against law enforcement agencies is well known among authorities in the Russian Northern Caucasus. It has been continuing in the Caucasus for quite a long time, with occasional success. I do not think that Hizb-ut-Tahir, or any other religious groups in Kyrgyzstan, have such authority. God save us from them acquiring such power. In my opinion, such claims are rather declarations of one's intentions. Takhir Yuldashev has also declared a "war" against all Central Asian Presidents. Yet, states must not ignore such declarations. National authorities must pay great attention to local news and be ready for anything. Things may start anywhere, be it Uzbekistan or Afghanistan, and easily spill over to neighboring countries. One should keep in mind that not only ‘anti-terrorists,' but also terrorists themselves are capable of cooperation.

IPP: How would you assess the current counterterrorism and counter-extremism policies of Kyrgyz authorities?

Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: The Kyrgyz authorities use banal policies, reminiscent of the policies employed in neighboring countries. Since I personally have had an opportunity to indirectly participate in one of these anti-terrorist operations, I can testify that the majority of the time, these operations target people who do not have any relations to terrorism, but quite on the contrary, are fighting terrorism themselves. On the other hand, recently there have been no excesses related with religious extremism in Kyrgyzstan. This gives law enforcement agencies grounds to claim their operations successful.

IPP: Then how must this policy be improved to be more effective at minimizing religious tension while reducing the influence of radical movements in Kyrgyzstan?

Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: I think the main tactic should be a "Carrot and Stick" policy. It is necessary to communicate to Islamists willing to talk, even with radical religious groups. The main thing to do is to not provoke people to ascend the "extremism ladder". People are not born as terrorists. In many respects, terrorism is often provoked by the policies of national authorities.

IPP: To what extent does the social situation in Kyrgyzstan predispose a further escalation in confrontation between the religious minority (or majority) and the national authorities of Kyrgyzstan?

Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: The tension may only arise if the whole social situation gets much worse. In the event of a conflict, any political party would find its proper role. Neither Hizb-ut-Tahir, nor any other groups would be able to do this on their own.  They may be able to organize two or three serious meetings, yet only at the local level. People are tired of political tension. But then again, let me reiterate that everything depends mainly on the position and policies of the national authorities.

IPP: What about any external influences on the social situation in Kyrgyzstan?

Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: First of all, one could only expect external influences to affect Kyrgyzstan if the society is primed for that. An Arab-style Islamic fundamentalism or any other religious fundamentalism will only prosper locally if the population is antagonized by economic and social failures by the state. In Kyrgyzstan, such preconditions do exist. Yet, at the same time, I believe that the society still hopes to be able to overcome these challenges independently. There are not many foreign religious fundamentalists operating within Kyrgyzstan. Regarding graduates from foreign, religious universities who imported other variations of Islam to Kyrgyzstan, for the time being, their target groups are limited. 

IPP: How would you assess the fears of impending radical Islamist rule in Uzbekistan, as domestic power struggles continue to grow? What would be their impact be on Kyrgyzstan?

Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: They will not be able to come to power; however, they could certainly participate in various political coalitions. Similar instances have taken place in many Muslim countries, from Tajikistan to Yemen, Malaysia, and even to Turkey. If one were to assume that the Central Asian States are within the Islamic sphere of influence, which indeed they are, then a dialogue with varying degrees of Islamism must be recognized as a part of the political process. We must not discount the potential of some moderate Islamists to become elected members to government.