Definition of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s geographic zone is quite easy –the territories of its member states. However, it is clear that such a geographical definition cannot be considered as the SCO’s zone of interests. Obviously, the organization’s interests include Central Asia, and possibly the southern adjacent neighbors of Central Asia, primarily Afghanistan. In this context, not only China and Russia have interests in Central Asia, but also the U.S. Furthermore, the interests of China and Russia in other regions of the world do not entirely coincide with the zone of interests of the SCO.

In declarative form, the zone of interests could be considered a zone of the SCO’s responsibility. In my opinion, nobody is trying to make a secret of this orientation. The issue is only about the way it is structured in terms of organizational and political principles, and in terms of the aggregation of interests of all SCO member-states.

In the context of the above-mentioned points, the Central Asian states are seen not only as subjects of the organization, but also as objects of the efforts put into the SCO, mainly by Russia and China. Additionally, the SCO has one significant and unique feature – the smaller the country, the less developed (and slower developing) it is, including per capital criteria.

This feature is one of the reasons why the Central Asian states are inclined to consider relations with the U.S. not within the framework of SCO-U.S.A, but in the framework of triadic U.S.A.-China-Russia relations. Such a framework of constructing relations is dominant. Moreover, obvious latent problems in the relations of latter two powers are affecting SCO’s operation to a certain degree. Besides, there are some contradictions within the Central Asian states. It is for this reason that cooperation and partnership within the same international organization is accompanied by competition. This tension is not surprising however, as all interstate unions are characterized by the same phenomenon: the European Union, ASEAN, and many others. The question is, what is prevalent both in the activities of SCO itself and of its member-states: common interests, or the preferences of each individual state? Is the SCO is a zone of common interests for the security and development of all, or does each member-state fight on its own?

For the time being, along with a certain degree of progress, there are also many problems and contradictions in the activities of SCO.

One of the major contradictions is a conflict over the  declared principles of cooperation, both within the framework of the SCO itself, and with the states and organizations that lie beyond the borders of the SCO and the interests of its participating states.

In particular, there are issues with the well-known SCO principle of openness. It is great that the SCO is building business relations with the European Union, ASEAN, Collective Security Treaty Organization, EvrAzEs, and other international organizations. However, the strange thing is there are no relations with the U.S.A. and NATO. The latter took the responsibility for the development of the situation and, finally, for the destiny of Afghanistan, the country which presents the most acute problems for the security of Central Asia. It is obvious that the security issues of the regions cannot be resolved without America, for the time being at least. Besides, the U.S.A. has established a direct presence not only in Afghanistan, but also in Central Asia.

Each SCO member-state has its own scheme of relations with Washington (even those states which did not want to have any), but the SCO as a whole lacks contacts with the U.S.A., even in the form of basic consultations. Such an approach to partnership with the U.S.A. and NATO complicates the implementation of another declared SCO principle – the principle of corporation or consolidation, especially for Central Asian states. Bilateral Russian-American and Chinese-American negotiations and consultations regarding security in Central Asia have likely been causing bewilderment, if not a sense distrust, among Central Asian states. Also, it is important to take into account that the situation in Afghanistan is worsening (it is known that the Taliban has taken under its control almost 70% of Afghanistan’s territory), and I believe that it is in the SCO’s interests to begin consultation with America on this issue. It is time for such a step, especially given Washington’s interest in building contacts with the SCO.

Also, I would like to say few words about the relations of the SCO with the Collective Security Treaty Organization and EvrAzEs. One might think that such a partnership has meaning. However, the participation of CIS states, all of whom are members of the SCO except Belarus and Armenia, in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and EvrAzEs makes one think that SCO states are negotiating among each other primarily, and then separately with China. In addition, commitments taken by participating states in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and EvrAzEs have a certain influence on their stance in the SCO.

The only positive aspect is that still there have not been any obvious contradictions or problems in the positions of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, EvrAzEs, and SCO. Such a format of cooperation between the Collective Security Treaty Organization, EvrAzEs, and SCO seems like a protective construction from excessive activeness on the part of China. From the point of view of those CIS countries who are members of the SCO, such an approach might be justified. In that case however, it will be quite challenging to construct a zone of joint responsibility and development within the framework of the SCO.

A separate issue is the admission of new members into the SCO. Apparently, no member-states are against seeing such respected countries as India, Pakistan and Iran enter into the SCO. The important question however is: for what purposes would these countries like to be SCO participants? Accepting the SCO Charter, internal regulations, and program documents of the SCO, are these countries indeed ready for the project of forming a zone of mutual responsibility? Undoubtedly, these issues concern Iran the most, the membership of which would strengthen an anti-American component in the SCO’s image, although it is worth recognizing that anti-Americanism is currently turning into a trend – actively spreading in the developing world as a result of the insufficiently thought-out foreign policy of Washington. Are the SCO and each of its participating countries, Kyrgyzstan for example, ready to take responsibility for the nuclear policy of Iran and the possible deterioration of Iran-American relations?

If we consider SCO activities in view of an organizational-methodological sequence and political hierarchy – “intentions-planning-implementation-prospects” – currently, only two aspects are clear and well-defined: intentions and prospects.

1. Intentions, both public and unpublicized, are indeed optimistic and transparent. From this point of view, they seem to be relevant and useful for all Central-Asian states without any exceptions. Economic development can progress much faster in close cooperation with such economic giants as Russia and China, which, moreover, have decent political weight, than it could alone or even in a “purely Central-Asian team.”

Active, productive economic cooperation only within the SCO will allow the Central-Asian states to take serious steps in the development of their economies.

2. Planning in the economic sphere is complicated by a high level of bureaucracy and excessive regulation of activity, exacerbated by yet-to-be-agreed-upon bilateral relations (in some cases multilateral) on SCO territory.

Excellent and fairly promising projects, including the Business Council, Economic Forum, Interbank Association, Forum for the Scientific Community and other structures of the “secondary echelon” may become shallow and useless accessories to summits if they are not brought to life.

In Bishkek in 2004, SCO members agreed about joining their efforts on 6 priorities: 1) transport, 2) energy, 3) electricity, 4) agriculture, 5) production of household appliances, and 6) light and heavy manufacturing industry. A program for trade and economic cooperation until 2020 was approved.

It is quite obvious that all six of these priorities are, first of all, important for the Central Asian states. However, it is worth recognizing that further promotion of these projects is being impeded by internal contradictions in the uncoordinated stances of SCO countries. The same is true about the activity of the SCO in cultural and humanitarian partnership, as well as in information work.

3. For the purposes of project and program implementation, various types of special groups have been created. The latest ones are special groups on the fuel and energy industry and information and communication technologies, formed during the Tashkent meeting. So far, none of these projects have been implemented.

Analysis of the trends in cooperative development (the movement from intentions to implementation) shows a shift from the dominance of common interests at the stage of intentions to the dominance of individual (country) interests at the stage of the implementation.

On August 24^th, a meeting of the ministers responsible for the foreign policy of SCO states was held in Tashkent. The main purpose of the meeting was to prepare for the summit of Prime-Ministers. However, aside from declaratory statements touching upon the realization of projects and programs, nothing significant was signed.

At the meeting of Prime-Ministers in Dushanbe, we heard old and new intentions, statements about the need to revive cooperation and about the forms and methods of its implementation. We also heard about bright prospects for trade, as well as for economic and cultural-humanitarian partnership. Still, nothing went beyond these statements.

Meanwhile, activity is more dynamic within bilateral agreements, although it is worth highlighting that the influence of SCO agreements on this type of partnership, though indirect, has been observed nonetheless.

It is obvious that dynamic advancement towards the creation of a mutual responsibility and development zone mainly depends on Russia and China.

The Central Asian states should become more active in the SCO as well; it is necessary not only to express their opinions and intentions, but also to be more active in program implementation. Among all existing and possible future intergovernmental organizations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization remains the most promising and effective one.