The international authority of the European Union (EU) as an influential political, economic, and military actor [1] in international politics is indisputable at the moment. Despite unstable conditions in the current international system, the EU managed to create a competitive institutional monster, which unites 25 (soon 27) states in Europe under the firm protection of a strong Euro and mobile European army. It is not surprising that in conditions of pluralistic unipolarity [2] the European pole has been growing more attractive because of high level of economic component in construction of common foreign policy.

In this context it is no coincidence that Kyrgyzstan has repeatedly declared its orientation toward the EU, which is one of the main donors supporting the transitional economy and democracy in the country. However, one cannot say for sure that Kyrgyzstan is politically and economically is committed toward the European direction. Certainly Kyrgyzstan benefits from the aid it receives, which is provided by the EU within the framework of numerous programs such as TACIS and the Food Security Program.   

The status of Kyrgyzstan as a partner of the EU, the universal Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU and its member states, and the extensive European presence in the region provides the foundation for productive and dynamic cooperation in all spheres. However, the achievements in this direction were modest, and one of the most important reasons for that is institutional misunderstanding.

LESSON ONE: THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL LABYRINTH

The complex institutional structure of the EU, resulting from more than half a century of integration processes, is a serious obstacle in gaining a full understanding of the peculiarities of the system. A mix of supranational principles and interstate mechanisms further complicates full comprehension of the EU as an international partner. The unorthodox form of decision-making in the EU, which employs different methods depending on the type of the problem, and the hierarchy of decisions also fail to bring clarity in determining an appropriate strategy when dealing with EU.  

In Kyrgyzstan, the Council of Europe (an international organization that focuses on human rights and international law) and the European Council (the main legislative body of the EU also known as the Council of the EU) are often confused. The peculiarity of the Council of the EU is in its multiple disciplines. It consists of 9 specialized councils; each of which is headed by a  national minister from an EU member state. The European Council defines the long-term political policy of the whole union and uses the interstate principle in decision-making, i.e. decisions made by the Council reflects a common will of all member states, which is often achieved by consensus.   

The executive body of the EU is the European Commission, which follows the principle of supra-nationality that guarantees implementation of policies favoring common European interests over national interests. In relations with partners, including also Kyrgyzstan, first and foremost the Commission represents the face and generous hand of the EU, as it controls the main funds for aid and development support. 

At the present moment, the role of the European Parliament is increasing as one of elements in the “European institutional triangle,” which consists of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. Yet, the importance of the European Parliament has slightly decreased, because EU parliamentarians have a deliberative vote in all spheres except decisions on budget issues. However, a fact that the European Parliament is a parliament in true meaning of the word, which is formed by direct elections and not by representatives of national parliaments, more and more plays important role in the formulation of common European public opinion. This gains special importance in the context of the establishment of common European political parties.   

Thus, it is clear that in order to build an effective partnership with the EU, it is necessary to conduct full cooperation in three directions: with the interstate Council, where the national interests of leading countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands can influence the general direction; with the supra-national Commission, which embodies the common European approach and controls considerable financial funds; and the Parliament, which has significant influence on the formulation of public opinion (the recent decision on economic sanctions against Uzbekistan exemplifies this) [3].

LESSON TWO: MECHANISM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES IN DECISION- MAKING PROCESS

As Germany took over the EU chairmanship on January 01, 2007, there have been heated debates about German (and European) foreign policy towards Central Asia. In this light, the recent visit of German Foreign Affairs Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to the Central Asian states may well trigger some false expectations.

The six-month long chairmanship held by EU member states, which now serves as a litmus test of internal and external policy of the EU, will sink into oblivion when the new European Constitution is adopted. Then there will be one minister serving in a supra-national capacity, who will coordinate all foreign policy of the EU. For the moment, the rotational chairmanship in the EU gives member states an opportunity to draw shades of national interests into the common European policy. For example, Luxemburg prioritized an issue of finalizing a new edition of the Lisbon process, the main economic indicator for the EU. Austria and Finland turned its attention to the somewhat forgotten Balkans. In this regard, the optimistic mood in Central Asian countries about future cooperation with an EU headed by Germany is quite understandable.    

However, taking into consideration that half a year is not always sufficient enough term to realize set priorities, it is logical to guess that it is unlikely that Portugal, which will hold the chair in the second half of 2007, will continue Germany’s focus on Central Asia. Likely they will prefer to focus instead on relations with the countries of the Mediterranean and Maghreb. In this context it is quite obvious that our expectations are disproportionately high because of the ‘ever-changing’ policy of the EU chairmanship, balanced by the steady policy of the European institutions.     

An example of such balance is the division of the mandate to conduct common foreign policy of the European Union between the so-called “unofficial three”: the EU Chairman; the Higher Representative of the EU on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and the EU Commissar on External Affairs, who belongs to various institutions of the EU.

The EU Chairman, at the same time the minister of foreign affairs of the chair state, first of all pursues national interests and tries to use the European mission in order to promote his own initiatives at the international level. Overly ambitious initiatives are often neutralized by the conservative approach of European structures (as in the case with Belgium in 2001) [4].

The EU High Representative for the CFSP is a part of the institutional structure of the European Council, the main coordinating and legislative body of the EU. The position was specially introduced to create balance and secure coordination in conducting foreign policy in the European Council, where chairmanship is transferred every half a year from one member state to another and correspondingly priorities in foreign policy vary according to foreign policy interests of chairman state. The position of the High Representative secures continuity and stability of common foreign policy of the EU.   

EU Commissioner on External Affairs is one of 25 member of the Commission, which is main executive body of the EU. Because of the important role of the Commission for the EU in the international arena, the role of the Commissar also increasingly evolves into that of a unified representative and spokesperson for the EU. The Commissar primarily focuses on the common supra-national interests of the EU and builds relationships with other countries on behalf of the EU.

LESSON THREE: AN INSIDE LOOK

Considering the EU is one of the constant elements of its foreign policy, Kyrgyzstan is somewhat irresponsible about its partnership with Europe. The all-inclusive and universal character of the PCA between Kyrgyzstan and the EU [5] means there is almost unlimited potential for Kyrgyz-European cooperation in various spheres including power sector reformation and border control to cooperation in education and culture. The PCA, which is the second highest normative act in the hierarchy of European legislation after agreements on associations, creates much space for cooperation, since it establishes a clear mechanism and institution for cooperation. Meanwhile, short-term action plan agreements and declarative memorandums would presuppose much focus on formal aspects of cooperation.

The partnership between Kyrgyzstan and the EU has lasted more than 15 years. The almost legendary TACIS program, which terminates in 2007, has also been established for the same amount of time. From now on, technical aid will be provided through the line of special strategy of the European Commission for Central Asia..  Despite mutual attempts, they did not manage to move beyond simple aid packages and advance to the next level of developmental support. Kyrgyzstan did not use all the advantages of the PCA and its special partnership with the EU, continuing receiving grants from donors, including the EU, as it has during the past 15 years.  

Continuity, stability and consistency are three basic dominant principles in the European system of values. The values unfortunately are not always present in Kyrgyz policy, which is characterized by mismanagement of human resources and political fragmentation. It is hard to talk about real partnership relations without first having mutual understanding and trust, based on work and not just on declarations.    

HOMEWORK

The institutional challenges of the EU and its changing geometry must not mislead us, but on the contrary give us opportunity to use the situation for the national interests of our country. Unfortunately, today we do not talk about a higher level of PCA realization. Rather, the following question arises: “Do we want to build cooperation with the EU at all?” If yes, then we have to define what we want from such cooperation. The best solution would be to develop an strategy, which would include a vision of Kyrgyzstan’s future cooperation with the EU supported by concrete plans and objectives. The very elaboration of such a document will force us to reevaluate the European direction of our policy in a pragmatic manner.

Cooperation with European institutions is not limited to one or two areas, and it is important to coordinate Kyrgyz policy toward the EU and the material aid received. A wide-ranging coordinated policy for all state structures involved in European issues with special working group on cooperation with the EU guiding interactions might bring positive results for Kyrgyzstan. It would be wise to appoint a special independent representative or coordinator on European policy in response to the appointment of the EU special representative for Central Asia. 

In this regard, it is important to train officials with specialized knowledge. It forces us to think that in Kyrgyzstan, while there are about 40 universities, there is not a single educational program on European research. Knowledge in this area is in high demand around the world.

We continue to say that the European model of integration (especially the institutional aspect) is a model for the same processes in the Central Asia. But while we are engaged in the framework of the so-called “Bishkek’s process,” the EU tries to arrange negotiations with every Central Asian state in order to find common ground, we say that we are all unique and need different approaches. And when the EU tries to use a differentiated approached, we begin point at each other, demanding similar approach as our neighbors receive. It is a circular argument, but integration, which results from compromises and consensus for the benefit of all, can lead us out of this closed circle. We must learn not only to receive material aid, but also to listen to advice.