Paper delivered at the conference "Central Asia in 2007: Dynamics of Change and Development", organized by the Institute for Public Policy on 2 March 2007.

Regional integrationism along with such phenomena as dialogue between civilizations and globalism are the three main foundations upon which a new systemic construction of international relations is being built at present. In this context there is a certain modality of collective actions on the international scene.  This is the conceptual and practical imperative, the challenge faced by the states of the international community. This challenge is of particular urgency for the so-called new independent states of Central Asia, which emerged from the post-Soviet area who recently marked the fifteenth anniversary of their independence.

The issue of national and regional identity is a very important issue for the people of the Central Asian region. When apologists of the economic determinism of regional integration advance their arguments in order to prove the failure, or premature, integration of Central Asian states (in view of their economic differences) they certainly do not pay attention to one fundamental fact: that their rationalism of economic conditionality to integration is applicable to the case of full-fledged state formations, of pre-industrial and industrial epochs. In our case, given the universal tendency towards a regionalization of international relations, there is an incompleteness to the process of political cartography in Central Asia. There is an insurmountable obstacle to its completion, which was historically formed by a transborder way of life for the inhabitants there, for whom national identity does not conform to the imposed international borders. But there is also an economic irrationality to delimitation.

Waves of integration and disintegration colliding with each other create such complex geo-socio-cultural and political issues of regional development, that it is difficult to see the distinction between national and regional.

However, at present after 15 years of independence declared in December 1991 by five Central Asian states (in response to the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States by three Slavic states) the course for integration has become locked. The paradox of Central Asia lies in its national-regional dualism. It seems that in many respects it has caused the present ad-hoc situation, so to speak, in the process of regional integration. Indeed, this phenomenon of dualism has to a certain degree led to an inadequate understanding of national interests. Central Asian states and their leaders have become entangled in the development of regional strategy.

There are both objective and subjective elements in the current situation in the region. The formation of national statehood constitutes the objective factor. The creation of a new statehood with all it involves, including the accumulation of experience in conducting domestic and foreign policy, and integration into the world community, are unprecedented tasks.  They have basically become an end in themselves and a sense of self-worth for all post-Soviet states.

The character and peculiarities of political leadership in these countries constitute the subjective factors. Lack of will and even loyalty to the idea of integration (what in English literature is referred to as "commitment") has inhibited this process. The same idea could translate to the popular idea of the existence of a mythical competition between the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for leadership in the region.

The increased threat of terrorism and the repeated excursions of terrorists from one Central Asian state to another, alongside other security threats, have sowed distrust and accusations among these states. Thus the mining in certain sections of Uzbekistan's border with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the introduction of a visa policy with the neighboring states totally contradicts the aim of integration set out in 1991. Common security challenges in all five states of the region have caused five independent national responses instead of one unified response, which has not led to strengthening of either regional or national security at all.

Besides, a delay in the integration process was met by the inadequate intervention by geopolitical elements. Non-self-sufficiency of the Central Asian states, geopolitically, was clear for the entire period of independence. The states naturally turned out to be unprepared for the dramatic geopolitical transformation that then hit the region.

"Access to resources [of the region - F.T.] and receiving a share of its potential wealth, - writes Brzezinsky, - represent those goals, which stimulate national ambitions, determine corporate interest, enliven historical demands, revive imperial aspirations and kindle international rivalry... Geostrategic implications are clear for America: America is too far away to dominate in this part of Eurasia, but too powerful not to be involved... Russia is too weak to restore its imperial domination over the region or exclude such domination on the part of other powers, but too close and strong to be excluded." (Brzezinski, Zb. The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy аnd its Geostrategic Imperatives (BasicBooks - Harper Collins Publishers, Inc, 1997), p. 125, 148)

All of this put Central Asians into a very difficult situation. They had to take advantage of the uniqueness of their geopolitical situation, increase the attention paid to them internationally, and reinforce their image in international relations as a region: being ready to meet the challenges of the time by coordinating their foreign policy, and demonstrating regional strategy as a primary direction in their foreign orientations. This regionalization of relations, as it was mentioned in the beginning of the paper, is the imperative of the modern world.

However, a narrow, limited understanding of the world, global processes, the nature of world order after the end of the "cold war" and failure to be ready to develop adequate response to geopolitical challenges, determined the relevance of an exclusively old model of the "balance of power" with the new international relations in the post-Soviet area. Moreover, a Minor Game among the states of the region is unfolding against the background of the Great Game in the region. As a result, Central Asia has not so far gained its common geopolitical place. The recent merger of the Organization of the Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC) with the Eurasian Economic Cooperation (retaining the name of the association "EEC") became a striking confirmation.

Central Asia continues to remain as both a geographic and historical reality. Out of the three factors mentioned (which inhibit the process of regional integration in Central Asia) the first - related to the necessity of the creation of statehood - loses its topicality in view of the completion of this task over the 15-year period. Now it seems that it is possible to switch from state to regional construction. The second, subjective factor is transient by nature. Remaining is the third - the geopolitical factor. This is a very complex issue in view of the present proliferation of geopolitical actors in the region. At the same time, out of all these players, a symbolic geopolitical triangle comprising the USA-Russia-China in Central Asia should be noted. Our analysis of the policies of the states of this triangle demonstrates that it is possible to envisage four possible future geopolitical manifestations in Central Asia.

The first is the status of a buffer zone. Most likely this is in the interests of Russia for two reasons: one reason is of an offensive character - considering the Central Asian region as a zone of its historical responsibility and geopolitical control in its long-term reach towards the Indian Ocean; another reason is of a protective character - considering the Central Asian region as a zone, which protects Russia/empire from direct contact with a geopolitical opponent (first it was Great Britain, later, the USA). Only the buffer status of Central Asia could serve such geopolitical interests of Russia.

The second possible status is that of a sanitary cordon. This would be more in the interests of the USA, which pursues the strategy of geopolitical pluralism, and proclaims its aspiration not to allow (or prevent) domination of any power in Central Asia.

The third possible role is as a base for expansion, which most of all would be in the interests of China. China could objectively consider Central Asia as its geopolitical rear and be predisposed to using the region in its movement to the West. This movement may take one of the two forms - territorial expansion or the extension of the sphere of economic and political influence (although the first scenario is unlikely to happen).

All of the scenarios mentioned above cannot objectively be accepted by Central Asian states since all these three positions primarily imply their subordination in some form or other to the will and actions of external powers, and disregard the will and role of Central Asians.

Therefore, the only relevant choice of the states of the region (a fourth status) is to become a united center of power. At present it becomes more evident that they cannot be totally independent and sovereign states unless they realize the principle of an integrated, independent and sovereign region. Such a "project", if it is destined to happen, is primarily in the interests of all global and regional powers - the participants of Central Asian geopolitics. Therefore the approaches of these participants towards this project may serve as an exact test of their real intentions in this part of the world.

Farkhod Tolipov, Kandidat politicheskih nauk, Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science, National University of Uzbekistan