Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the Institute for Public Policy

In the 19th century, two Europeans offered the world two definitions that predetermined the international community’s understanding of history and events in Central Asia. These definitions are, in general, opposite to each other in both concept and spirit.

Alexander Humboldt, in his research on various aspects of so-called Inner Asia development, proposed, as dominant element, that the trade and economic history of the region be called the Great Silk Road. Both the metaphoric and literal meanings are conceptually connected with the constructive process in the region. The function of the Great Silk Road was not only communication through trade, but also contact and mutual penetration of civilization spaces, which is accompanied by exchange of cultural, scientific, and other achievements- on the basis of which new discoveries were made in various fields of human activity. After all, it was a long-lasting and wide-ranging historical process which involved both sedentary and nomadic nations, with each serving its individual mission in the process. I would like to make one reservation: we do not intend to idealize the history of the Great Silk Road. In this case, ideas and meanings are the most important.

The second formula is associated with the name of a less famous European of British origin, Arthur Connolly, whose very interesting and instructive life, full of adventures, as it is known, is described in Richard Kipling’s novel “Kim.” Connolly coined the second definition of Central Asia that is well-known to the political and academic world. His is the concept of the “Great Game” that connected Central Asian nations with politics of great powers during his era. The “Great Game” of the 19th century ended with the division of the Central Asian region between three “players” and in the international legal system. The two main powers (the Russian and Britain empires) and the third one, so-called, accompanying power (Tsin Dynasty) were the main players and the legal agreements existed between the Russian and Chinese, Russian and British, and in other documents on border delimitation. We must also mention another historical fact in this connection: local nations, quasi-state, and state establishments that existed in the region did not participate in this process.

From a historical philosophy perspective, evaluating the history of the Great Silk Road and the “Great Game” is an analysis of the meaning of human being’s existence and activity, including the types and substantive projects of the political and economic interaction of Central Asian nations with their near or distant neighbors. Though assumptions usually lead to mistakes, I will hazard a guess that the history of the Great Silk Road is based on a philosophy of cooperation and, to some extent, prosperity in the Central Asian zone, while the second definition, the concept of the “Great Game,” is a philosophy of division and conflict. There is tension in these structures of evaluation and possibly historical facts coupled with serious analysis may refute such an approach. We are not trying to discern “the truth of life,” but rather want to understand current trends that mirror the past.

A new history of Central Asia has begun since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The death of that state is the death of “terra” –or the state concept of Eurasia that was constructed in the depths of a nomadic past, inherited by Russia later -which gave the new civilization the face for Eurasia. In contrast, today’s Russia has lost almost all Turkic elements of Eurasian statehood and faces serious problems in this area – namely, how to cover such a huge territory with such a small population under strong demographic pressure and fading “nomadic” mobility.

However, the collapse of the USSR cannot ever be separated from common historical context: this tragic event is only a part of the history of civilization catastrophes. I have written previously that mankind has passed a threshold of unpredictable conflict-prone territorial and time zones, which is related with the crisis of world religions, of global social-economic and humanitarian concepts, of the concept of the nation-state, of the environment and so on.

In this context, one of factors and simultaneously the main arenas of globalization is the “worldwide web,” which opened enormous new opportunities to interpret human being’s existence and to construct new meanings, new cultures, and new types of human communities. These opportunities are full of contradictions and risks; we are already experiencing the negative influence of some of them. In particular, in my opinion, the day is not far when there will be internet states with their own constitutions, governments, and so on. Right now we are witnessing the emergence of internet economics. Internet communities will give birth to new ideas, new religions, and new concepts of human development. It will be a painful processes.

In my opinion, the emergence of independent states in Central Asia was accompanied by two important social-economic and political decorations. First, a powerful state in the past, one of the two superpowers, turned into a dozen of states in one moment, each of which are individually listed in the second tier of the top one hundred states according to basic indicators. This first primarily to Central Asian states. Secondly, the Central Asian region turned from the remotest periphery of a huge empire, known to some as the Russian periphery populated by Muslim nations, into an object that attracts the interest of many states. The significance of the region for these countries has been growing perpetually over time and is continues to grow now.

However, we have to admit that independence did not bring a full-fledged statehood to Central Asian. These states are “guided” in the international arena, meaning they have only limited international legal status as an actual entity. We have to admit that attempts to play with the contradicting interests of big powers in the region are a more of a primitive political technique than a conceptual approach to achieving the objectives of each state’s foreign policy. Jumping from one side to another indicates a search for a “new backup” rather than an understanding of development. So far, powerful states have allowed Central Asian states to play this captivating and, as Central Asian leaders believe, profitable game.

Independence must be realized and understood by the intellectual and political elites of each country, yet this has not been the case in Central Asia thus far. It may happen through a permanent strengthening and diversification of an all-encompassing national system of values (or at least some fragments of it). The struggle for the sake of this system is most important, since it can give birth to the guidelines of political, socio-economic, and other behavior.

Modern value systems, which are considered most advanced, are frankly not familiar to the population of the region. In particular, it is worth noting that the ideas behind major historical revolutions, primarily the French, English and American Revolutions which laid down the basics of the current system of national statehood, market economy and law, left Central Asia intact.

I am often asked: “What about Eastern Asia, which has been developing so fast?” The answer is simple: the development of Asia during second half of the 20th century was strongly influenced by Japan, where theorists soberly approached the problem of “Europe-ization” of the country back in the mid-19th century. The neighboring countries imitated Japan; moreover, several states of Eastern Asia began by obtaining independence from Japan itself. At the same time, we cannot underestimate the significant efforts made by East Asian nations on their own, the presence of internal mechanisms of reciprocity, and the self-development of a national system of values.

Whether or not the idea behind the October Revolution of 1917 was understood in Central Asia is also a big question. The Marxism of Karl Marx is not known to Central Asians, while its adapted Russian version developed by Vladimir Lenin is learnt only to the extent of practical cohabitation with Russians, acknowledgement of their total leadership, and the results of their civilization acting in the region, which, along with prominent cultural and scientific names of global significance, gave birth to many local compradors from politics and ideology. It is hard to name at least one true theorist of Marxism in Central Asia.

The introduction of Islam and its values to Central Asia coincided with the hardest period of transition in the region and deepened the crisis.

Attempts to search for “values” in the archives of Central Asia’s own history were not always successful in the sense that the historical memory of the nations saved only fragments, which are not sufficient to restore a value system, much less construction an entirely new one. A reservation here is that we are not referring to values of ritual or ceremonial characters or idealized elements of behavioral stereotypes. Thus, the only path forward is to learn and study hard. Study the best.

But the “Big World” gives neither time for study nor easy (a-la Soviet) opportunities for advancement.

Now we are seeing the renewal of discussion about the Great Silk Road (or rather, its restoration) and about the “Great Game.” It is clear that these definitions have a certain ‘conditional’ meaning in their modern understanding and application regarding the (real politik?) real politics of superpowers in Central Asia. But we also know that virtual terms, categories, and definitions often very seriously influence actual decision making, including such things as designing processes or international projects.

On the other hand, the majority of political, economic, and other projects in the region implemented by big powers and international organizations relate to both the Great Silk Road and the “Great Game” themes. In other words, a combined version exists. It is up to Central Asian states themselves to clarify and understand all these issues; there is no one to help in this.

The “Big World” came to Central Asia with its own projects and concepts such as the “Bigger Central Asia,” the Strategy of the European Union, a “Japan-Central Asia,” the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and so on. To which philosophy should we related them, the Great Silk Road or the “Great Game?” Is it possible to make them compatible, in terms of reducing the potential for conflict and strengthening healthy competition? What is the role of Central Asian states in the these projects and concepts? These issues might seem naïve but they are certainly very topical for Central Asian states.

The Central Asian states are members of various international organizations, whose goals and objectives often do not coincide. Participation in these global and regional institutions sometimes requires fundamental change of position or silent agreement with what is considered unacceptable. Such is not expected exclusively of Central Asian states; there are lots of examples from other countries. But it is harmful and, in a certain sense, dangerous for “fledgling” states in the region. It is also an issue of selecting a philosophy.

In the first decade of 21st century, Central Asian states have faced another serious problem. The “Big World” offered to conduct international relations, including bilateral ones, around two global issues. The first is the fight against terrorism. Here it is totally clear that each actor in this battle field has their “own terrorist,” who sometimes are not considered such by the other actors. The second is the struggle for resources, most notably for energy resources.

Assuredly, both factors dramatically influence the domestic politics of Central Asian states, which sometimes awkwardly try to use them within the framework of relations between authorities and within the power structures of their own people. But both problems exert the most detrimental influence on the construction of national states. Values of culture, education, law, public relations and, however paradoxical it may sound for Central Asia, religion are given little “philosophical” attention.

Democracy and its growth in the region have long become a subject for political and financial-economic bargaining. The economy turned into a “feeding-trough” for ruling groups. It is regrettable that, due to subjective factors (while I do not underestimate the role of objective ones), Central Asia accepted the rules of the “Great Game” based on the struggle for fossil fuels and the fight against terrorism. Further escalation of the “Great Game” can turn the region into a source of both energy and terrorism, but not into something which would trigger admiration and pride.

The goal of Central Asian elites is to align the level, volume, dynamics, and quality of civilization development of the old (Euro-Atlantic) and the new (Asian-Pacific) zones of human progress. It is clear that such an achievement is only possible if the philosophy of the Silk Road is adopted as the conceptual basis for moving forward.

A technical comparison of the events of the 19th and 21st centuries is important simply to analyze the experience of creating a life and freedom of choice; comparative generalizations are senseless if not guided by a desire to learn lessons from the past. History hints that the countries of the region should become participants in all the processes that are already going on, or even just taking off.

Yet the most important thing is to independently form a new historical process, based on the philosophy of constructivism and cooperation rather than division along oil and gas pipelines.■