In the case of Kyrgyzstan those stimulating motives that make these fragments operational belong to different politico-cultural, historical and chronological dimensions but were brought into one space of ethnic behavior as a result of historical drift but not necessarily conscious choice.

Among those sources that triggered the basic lines of ethnic behavioral culture and the corresponding rules, one can name three major factors: nomadism, Islamism and Sovietism. To a certain extent they continue to form the substance and style of political, and other behaviors, of the people.

It is obvious that nomadism, Islamism and Sovietism cannot be synthesized into a new substance- they can only co-exist. The logic of constructing major "meanings" for human existence within each of these three fragments can be contradictory, if not strongly antagonistic. In particular, they concern such important questions as nation-state building, property issues, gender problems, etc. This is because the aforementioned fragments have not a common but a separate and individual effect on the behavior of Kyrgyz people, and may be relevant depending on any given situation. For example, parliamentary elections, relations with the authorities, etc.

Of course, one should not ignore marginal groups who deny all three elements, but even they have to act within a certain framework while establishing relations with the authorities or other groups of people. In other words, they should act in accordance with established rules.

Informal institutes which appeared on the basis of these three elements have a direct and apparent effect on the formation of self-identification models of the Kyrgyz ethos. Primarily it impacts the elites.

Among Kyrgyz ethnic groups a complex of informal institutes has been referred to as "kyrgyzchylyk" (kyrgyzism). I want to note that there is a similar situation in the neighboring countries of Central Asia, for example, "kazakhshylyk" among Kazakhs and so on.

In the early 90s there was an attempt to discuss "kyrgyzchylyk" at the public level and to recognize it formally as a basis for forming public relations and behavioral rules of any type - political, humanitarian, economic, etc. Recently there are ‘homegrown' intellectuals and politicians who argue for a "legalization" of "kyrgyzchylyk" by forming and giving substance to an informal Constitution. According to them, "kyrgyzchylyk" is a number of rules that are based on hypertrophically idealized national traditions and the cultural features of the Kyrgyz ethos, including sanjyra and other genealogical legacies.

There are sometimes efforts to make "kyrgyzchylyk" a kind of national ideology, including nationalism.

It has to be noted that not only the Kyrgyz people but also representatives of other ethnicities and sectors are involved in this interesting game.

It is quite difficult to consider "kyrgyzchylyk" as a group of persistent informal rules of public co-existence, because often "kyrgyzchylyk" is used to explain things that are beyond law and legal actions, i.e. criminal. However, the problem is not what it explains: that would be too simplistic. The problem is in considering the explained as something that happens inevitably. At the same time what must happen is accepted as right even if it is illegal. There is a counter-reaction, not because of breach of law but because the interests of those who lose out are not taken into account. Next time, it will be the same but those who have lost must win. A good example of this is the shift of Presidents in our country.

In this looseness and inconsistency, in my view, one can see the negative side of "kyrgyzchylyk". The question to ask regarding development is as follows: is it possible that "kyrgyzchylyk" could structure Kyrgyzstan's political life? If yes, in which direction? The question exists as to whether "kyrgyzchylyk" can become a progressive force. The question of substance: can "kyrgyzchylyk" replace a law? For example, the well-known sentence "which is stronger in Kyrgyzstan - law or kin?" has direct relevance to all three questions.

Other countries' experience shows that when there is the rule of law (i.e. formal rules for state functioning and behavioral culture) people's actions according to informal rules sometimes play a positive role contributing, for example, to the emergence of an informal rules or "soft" custom that is widely recognized, a shift in power or harmonious combination (within limits) of the activities of older and younger generations of politicians. It may sound paradoxical, but even corruption is an informal institute that has a different and sometimes positive "exhaust", when the interests of corruptions' acting participants and of the state are combined. I am not justifying corruption in any form: the point is that these exclusive phenomena show us the extremes of informal institutes' operation.

I agree with the point of some specialists that informal institutes are not informal organizations, but the informal rules of political and social behavior, i.e. it is a problem of the extent and quality of behavioral culture that is formed under the influence of various factors. I would like to note that having kinship and kinship relations (which do not exist in its classic meaning in Kyrgyzstan) do not represent an informal institute. It is an informal rule of kinship solidarity that is inherited as a historical memory and has gradually grown into the kin-regional principle of support depending on one's kinship, and regulates the political behavior of people. The best examples in this view are the formation of government and elections.

"Kyrgyzchylyk" as an informal institute requires, for example, having in government representatives of all tribes and kinships or at least of all regions. The absence of "one's own" in the government is taken poorly. The problem is not in ‘being represented' but it is in placing personal qualities and professionalism as secondary interests. According to the norms of behavioral culture in "kyrgyzchylyk", the powerful must maneuver within the cadre's policy. It is against law, even though it is not done directly but through intermediate actions and the behavior of "appointees."

During elections, "ours" is defined according to one's kin-regional origin or through the standard opposition. Informal institutes do not presuppose any other behavior of the people. Administrative and other resources in this case are deliberately excluded, even though it is predictable that they may be incorporated somehow into "kyrgyzchylyk".

In the context of this "kyrgyzchylyk", this does not correspond to certain norms of behavioral culture and contradicts current state legislature - both direct and mediated. Such phenomena are characteristic to almost all countries. However, the problem of our country lies in a completely different sphere. The "ever-winning power" of informal institutes, more precisely their negative impact, make law nonfunctional.

At the same time, "kyrgyzchylyk" as an informal institute of political behavior may encourage the process of revival of rather important and necessary traditions.

There is no need to enumerate which traditions exactly, but there is a need to consider the serious selection and adaptation of the current models.