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Bakyt Beshimov:
“Kyrgyzstan: is democracy on the agenda for the country?”
Valentin Bogatyrev:
“Status of formal political institutes and interactions with informal political structures in Kyrgyzstan”
Muratbek Imanaliev:
“Informal institutes as “rules of a political game” in Kyrgyzstan”
Not people’s state
The political act to declare independence of the Kyrgyz republic happened in August 31, 1991. It was mostly a reaction to the Moscow putsch as well as a drive for better positions during negotiations on concluding treaty on a new Union. The process of political system’s transformation started almost a year before this event, when the post of president then of the Kirghiz SSR was established in 24 October 1990. The most important events of the first months after August 31, 1991 were suspension of activities of Kyrgyzstan’s Communist party and conduction of the first nation-wide elections of President of the Kyrgyz Republic. However, the establishment of President’s institute and liquidation of the party monopoly did not trigger serious changes in the political system of the country.
There was revolution neither in 1990 nor in 1991. It did hot happen later as well. Kyrgyz political institutes, and above all, state in the sovereign country remained the same. Although the main issue of internal politics that had been addressed by leadership of the country was transformation of the Soviet political system into democratic one of western democracies, nevertheless, the Kyrgyz political system was formed in accordance with Soviet traditions. In other words, it was like a pyramid, at the top there is president - a head of state, and then three relatively independent branches of power.[1] Here, President had authorities to form government, nominate candidates for the positions of head and members of the Supreme Court and dissolve Jogorku Kenesh in cases stipulated in the Constitution.
Some changes of his competence that were introduced later concerned only a necessity to have an approval of Jogorku Kenesh to appoint members of government. If one disregards new names of political institutes, one may see a scheme of governance of the Soviet state but now with a greater absolutism, since quasi but still collective power of Political Bureau of Communist party’s Central Committee was replaced by the sole power of president. The entire system of state governance has been formed on the basis of those structures that existed in the Kirghiz SSR. As a result the rudiments of the former system remained for a long period and may be seen in functions and structures of state bodies.
Despite the democratic character of elections, president similar to the former leaders of state had a decisive, in most cases monopolistic and total controlling power. He and his administration controlled all aspects of country’s life even those spheres that were under competence of other branches of power. President had unlimited power over government, and within first 10 years over Jogorku Kenesh by using different leverages including a possibility to dissolve parliament. Judicial power was also under the control of president in practice. The structure of government were undergoing changes while adapting to realities and functions of market, however, it was preserving a format of branch together with numerous and redundant functions that remained since those days when state controlled citizens’ life completely. Under the conditions of low income of state officials, it created a favorable ground for corruption. To a certain extent, what was happening can be called a process when state officials privatized their own functions.
To avoid defects in the governance system, leadership of the country with the help of various international organizations and financial institutes introduced programs to reform administrative system that stipulated for a change on the basis of functional analysis of state structures competence and introduction of new administrative formats. Some changes included a new model of public service with a distinction of political and administrative positions; employment on competitive basis, compulsory declaration of state officials’ income and consequently of their family members as well.
By introducing amendments to the Constitution in 2003, the judicial reform was basically completed. To improve independence of courts, a long-term appointment of judges and special procedure of their repudiation were adopted. However, the administrative reform did not change a nature of governance system; its functions incorporated mainly a non-market and administrative governance. State machine continued to dominate by shaping business, citizens’ life and ignoring human and human rights as fundamental values. Decreasing of a number of government personnel did not change its nature, and after a short period, a number of state officials reached the previous number and even increased. In 1997-2007 there was a process of changing political system towards strengthening the role of parliament and government while limiting president’s authorities. This was the main point of political struggle within this period. After several constitutional amendments, a number of authorities mainly with regard to the appointment of government were given to the Jogorku Kenesh.
Initiators of such changes thought that thereby the nature of state would change since Jogorku Kenesh is an institution of people’s representatives. However, ineffective system of parliamentary elections, which was reduced in practice to buying of votes, applying administrative resources, clan-based preferences resulted in having parliament which did not represent interests of voters, hence, the nature of power had not been changing. It did not belong to people as before. A new edition of Constitution adopted in 2007 introduced a new procedure of elections to the Jogorku Kenesh- a system, based on political party lists. However, all these changes and administrative reforms did not change and do not change a nature of political institutes.
The major reason: state-building by society has not happened yet. People is a source of power in the Kyrgyz Republic, but the Kyrgyz sovereign state in 1991 was established not by people – they did not have a mandate of people to perform those acts. State was and remains to be a ‘property of elites,’ a political institute that functions in accordance with rules and procedures defined in a quasi-democratic format. The most serious problem in the process of democratization is the state machine, in a form as it exists now. This is a hierarchical structure that remains since the Soviet times, and it is not national in its nature, and not democratic in its substance. The major problem is that there have not been a change of governing elite. At the high level of governance the key positions are taken by people who were brought up in the Soviet tradition and do not know or do not want to use technologies of democratic governance.
The only real step towards formation of democratic political institutes was introduction of self-governance institute. In accordance with the Constitution of 1993 there was a right for self-governance; in 1994 a special Provision on the basics of local self-governance was developed and its subsequent adoption was a start to form an election system of self-government.[2] The first elections of deputies to local councils (keneshs) were on 24 October 1994, it replaced the Soviet system of Soviet deputies. In 1996 administrative bodies – ayil okmotu (village government) were established in rural areas under the village councils. At the same time, local communities were delegated a number of state functions while objects for public use became communal property. In 1997 the governance of cities were transformed into the format of self-government. The first pilot elections of self-government’s management were conducted in 2000, and since 2001 all heads of ayil okmotu were elected through direct elections. However, even though it was intended to work out a proper mechanism for self-provision and self-financing[3] as stated at the start of forming the system of self-government, this intention was not realized.
The law on “The basics of financing self-government” was adopted only in December 2004, which introduced a new way to form local budgets, providing some perspectives for local development. After renewal of legislation local keneshs confirm budget and programs of social and economic development of their respective territories, introduce local taxes, and decide on other issues of villages and towns. But until today central bodies use various pretexts and delay the process of transforming self-government into an independent unit that is able to form its own budget, Except the problems of independent financing of self-government there are attempts to limit political independence of elected bodies of self-government. According to the new edition of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, adopted at the referendum on October 21, 2007, the direct elections of heads of ayil okmotu were replaced with elections by local keneshs upon nomination of local state administrations.
Thus, these political institutes are also dependent on state and loose their democratic nature. By 2008 there is the presidential form of governance in the Kyrgyz Republic with the quasi-democratic system of political institutes which have ideology and functions of the command-administrative regime. Political institutes having a formal democratic status do not represent real social groups and political forces and do not serve as an instrument of people’s power. As a result of these reasons the political system has a clan-based nature instead of democratic, and the real power exists within informal structures and centers. The real politics appear only the limited spheres and concerns only a few issues of state and society’s functioning.
Some peculiarities of political parties’ consolidation
The process of formation of political parties in the country and their relations with other political institutes is becoming quite complex. After gaining sovereignty and choosing the course for democracy-building, a great number of parties appeared on the political stage. By November 1991 the Ministry of Justice registered 65 parties and movements.[4] The significant part of them did not exist anymore. By July 1, 1995 there were only 12 registered political parties and 6 social and political movements.[5] The main type of parties which appeared in those days in Kyrgyzstan was a few associations that were formed owing to and around certain political leaders. Moreover, there were parties formed on the basis of remnants of the CPSU as well as parties formed with the help of administrative resource for the sake of campaigns in 1995 and 2000. In the course of election period, some small initiative parties were created by certain new political leaders.
The effort in 1998 to stimulate the process of parties’ development by introducing a new way to form a part of the Jogorku Kenesh that is based on political parties’ lists gave certain, and above all, a quantitative effect. The great number of parties was established, including such large parties as “Adilet,” “Ar-Namys” and “Moya strana” that are correspondingly of centrist and right-wing orientation. These parties started competing with left-wing communist block. Nevertheless, pre-election political period was mainly characterized by struggle of blocks that had been formed by that time. Those parliamentarians who were elected to the Jogorku Kenesh based on the party’ lists were not able to form party fractions.
During elections to the Jogorku Kenesh in 2005, 6 parties proposed their candidates and only 16 deputies from political parties were in the parliament, and in practice there were no party fractions. By March 2005 there were 42 registered political parties in the Kyrgyz Republic.[6] Despite the growing tendency of political activeness, it is necessary to state that political parties do not have a clear and sustainable social basis. Sociological researches conducted in November 2004 show the fact that many parties are hardly known by people, and the latter has little trust in parties. Among total number of survey participants, 34.1% could not answer the question: which political parties in Kyrgyzstan they know. In September 2003 38.1% of those questioned had difficulties in answering the same question. The high point of popularity of parties is in Bishkek -60.1%. At that, only 6 parties have popularity rate above 5%, and 3 more parties have more than 3%. In 2007 when elections to the Jogorku Kenesh were to be based on political parties’ lists, a number of political parties sharply increased and went over 100. However, it is hardly possible that all these parties existed in reality. As shown in the recent elections, 50 parties expressed their will to participate, only 20 submitted the lists of candidates, 12 parties reached the finish line, and only 3 parties gained seats in the parliament. The results of the first elections on the party lists show that political parties have not yet gained a real social support.
Right prior to the elections 25.8% of respondents did not have an idea whom they would vote for or they did not intend to vote for any party. However, it was still a serious step forward since in June of 2007 77.3% of those questioned did not know in favor of which political party they would vote. The current structure of party space reflects only to a small extent a new social structure of society and new structure of social goals and expectations.[7] Left and left-centrist parties represent interests of those social strata that are undergoing the most difficulties because of the transition to the market economy. These are pensioners, youth, poor and socially non-protected social strata as well as proponents of socialistic values. To the contrary, the right and right-centrist parties unite new social groups: entrepreneurs, owners of large economic units, proponents of national revival idea. The majority of parties is of centrist orientation and composes 62% of total number. The centrist parties engage such social strata that concentrate somewhere close to the state agencies and state enterprises, financed from the budget.
In the context of non-satisfactory political culture, these factors seriously reduce the potential of political parties to participate in the process of formation and realization of public policy.[9] It must be noted that as a result of elections to the Jogorky Kenesh in December 16, 2007 some fundaments for formation of a new party space have been laid down. Irrespective from participation in elections and their results, one may say that there is a distinct and small group of parties which represent the real interests of social groups and certain real social ideas. These parties are currently in various conditions, in a kind of proto-form; however, they exist and have a certain impulse for development. There are parties of a new type like the political party “Zamandash,” which rely on a large social group of labor migrants and represent their interests, and the party “Turan” which is based on the ideology of the modern nationalism. Unfortunately, such a status was lost by the political party “Ata-Meken,” which for the sake of elections united in its structure those groups that are ideologically different and even oppositional. As a result, the party which was an ideological party struggling for socialist ideas turned into the party of a part of protesting electorate which represents mostly northern regions of the country. The change in the political structure after the elections, and in particular, the formation of the Jogorku Kenesh, which is based completely on the party lists resulted in improvement of chances of political parties to become political institutes in the full meaning and to concentrate the real politics. Now, it is political parties which will decide strategies and policies and form the corresponding legislative basis.
At the same time, the realization of these chances in practice will depend on the extent and quality of the party building process. It concerns both oppositional and first of all, the pro-presidential party “Ak Jol.” The latter has a good chance to become the main point to form strategies and policies for the country’s development as well as to become a formal institute to legitimize president’s authoritarianism. The composition of the party and candidates proposed to the Jogorku Kenesh indicate a serious closeness of this political organization to informal political institutes.
Civil society as a political institute
The insufficiency of democratic governance experience and weakness of state institutes that are characteristic to the transition period is historically compensated by non-governmental organizations. The activities of NGOs, especially in the first years of reforms compensated for a deficiency in functioning of government and political parties. Under the conditions when political parties in the initial stage of their development were mainly client-type organizations, it was non-governmental organizations which represented political interests of different social groups. According to the extent of involvement into political processes NGOs have been divided and continue to be divided into those:
A number of NGOs, especially large public associations incorporate all four types. For example, Assembly of Kyrgyzstan’s peoples while representing interests of ethnic groups it is actively involved into the process of developing mechanisms to interact with state bodies and known as a large actor of political activities. The coalition of NGOs “For democracy and civil society” does not represent interests of concrete social groups but still claim to participate in major political processes and actively participate in formation of democratic mechanisms for interaction interact with state bodies. However, the replacement of functions of political parties by non-governmental organizations contains a substantial contradiction with the nature of political institutes as such. Non-governmental organizations act not within political interests’ space but within the space of values. It relates to the fact that majority of NGOs emerged as a derivative of a certain geopolitical function; they are a result of international organizations’ activities in Kyrgyzstan, i.e. of supra-national units. Those who initiated creation of NGOs are the international community, some initiative groups and even individuals interested to have representatives of not only developed countries in accessing processes of development and achievements of the modern civilization.[10] The value orientation of NGOs is one of reasons to explain the absence of sufficient social basis and civil support to them. A small part of population participates in NGO activities. According to the official data,[11] in 2004 there were more than 20 thousand people who worked in the NGO sector constantly, and up to 10 thousand people who worked on the temporary basis (consultants, experts) and more than 8 thousand volunteers.
The research conducted during preparation of the Report on human development that is relevant to the NGO activity shows that a number of NGO employees is much greater and sometimes may reach up to 100 thousand people, which constitutes 5% of total number of employed in the country. However, such an increase in employment at civil society organizations is a result of short-term projects and programs. Most of citizens are passive or even negative to NGO activities. Nevertheless, non-governmental organizations are quite active in performing political functions and show themselves as relatively strong political institutes. A good example is the campaign on monitoring referendum on a new edition of the Constitution and elections to the Jogorku Kenesh in 2007. NGOs were responsible for the main part of the work and later took a more consistent and principal position in evaluating quality of these events rather than political parties did. At that, there are a set of limitations on such position and role of non-governmental organizations in the political system of the country. Basic constitutional provisions that define activities of civil society continue to be contradictory and have elements of state monopoly in managing social processes. Political activity of non-governmental organizations is limited by financing and formats. For example, the right to conduct meetings, gatherings, demonstrations, protests is limited by the condition to inform in advance executive bodies or bodies of local self-government and by assignment of special places for such events. It is often used by local authorities to reject conduction of civil actions in those cases when it is not desirable. The transition into institutionalized forms and normative procedures of NGO sector interaction with other political institutes has been complicated to a great extent. The practice shows that new forms are perceived negatively both by state bodies and civil society. These forms need a serious norm-creation, installation and educational activities. One of the problems is mistrust between state bodies and institutes of civil society. In addition, there is no consent within civil society with regard to a number of issues on interaction with state.
Another problem is insufficient level of preparation of civil society representatives to have competent relations with state bodies. Moreover, there is a gap between public organizations and interests of social groups whom they represent.[12] In the course of election campaign there was a trend to have activists to move from NGOs to political parties. However, majority of them proceed with their dual positions which may result in some legal problems, since activities of many NGOs are financed by foreign or international sponsors while such financing for political organizations is prohibited by law. Hence, those NGO leaders who joined political parties must leave their activities in NGOs or they risk undergoing judicial investigation and being convicted in breaching the law. With the development of political institutes and strengthening of political parties, non-governmental organizations will loose their political functions or reduce the sphere of their actions.
The real power and political institutes The specific feature of the Kyrgyz society is that real power is concentrated not within political institutes which at best may serve as a ground for struggle or means for legitimization of power and actions of various groups who have the real power. The list of such groups includes:
Each of these groups vary according to the way and extent of inclusion into power relations, technologies it uses, formats of political activities and type of relations with formal political institutes. The first group – family clans, as usual, are directly included into formal political institutes, or control them by influencing different, above all, upper levels of governance system. The presence of family clans may be seen not only within state structures (executive branch of power, deputies, judicial power) but also within political parties, and to a less extent – within non-governmental organizations. From the point of influence, these are the most powerful and effective group because they have a high consolidation of purposes and coordination of politics. The family clans format of retaining and using power is the most widespread and exists in all levels of political system of the country. Family groups successfully hide their clan interests being directly included into political institutes and present their interests as public, corporate, institutional and so on, and thereby create an effective manipulating mechanism, which strengthens their power and makes this group ideologically less vulnerable.
The existence and functioning of family clan system of power using make political institutes, their purpose and functions simply formal. Power moves from political institutes to family. Around the most influential families in order to have an access to resources, there is a quite powerful group which provides services and uses their positions for resource controlling and having preferential regimes of work. Thus, during A.Akaev’s rule there were several such groups, members of which succeeded in making large amounts and/or gaining high positions in the system of political institutes (positions in the executive power, parliamentary mandates and so on). Naturally, with the shift of power, a part of them started serving a new powerful, and many those who did not want to do it, - turned into the “opposition.” Regional elites have less political energy, and hence, less access and scale of power. There are three levels of regionalization: territorial, local and tribal. Recently the latter is becoming more important.
At any case and as usual, regional factor of informal political preferences is secondary in comparison with the family one. In practice, regional component of power is expressed in the form of cadres’ policy. For example, during Akaev’s presidency it was characteristic to appoint to state positions representatives of kemin-naryn and talas regions, while with the rule of Bakiev there is a tendency to appoint representatives of southern regions. Regionalism is characteristic to all elements of political system. At the first stage of political parties’ formation regionalism was one of key and structural features of their emergence and activities. A shift to the systematic party building process, somewhat reduced the importance of this factor. At present only those political parties that unite representatives of all regions of the country may be successful.
It was especially strengthened as a result of inclusion of regional thresholds in order to gain representation in the Jogorku Kenesh. Nevertheless, the regional aspect is an important factor to provide stability of political system. There is a certain way of power distribution among regional political elites. Three factors impact the distribution process: traditional system of clan hierarchy, political history of certain elite of the given region and extent of economic influence and resource scale, which may be used for strengthening of regional power. “Opposition” as an important component of power relations emerged quite recently. The history of its participation in power relations started with the Aksy events. It was the first time when the official authorities and family clans felt the power of opposition groups. In this period, there were the fist signs of how pressure of opposition could make the official power to take political decisions that had been dictated by opposition (release of A.Beknazarov, cadre dismissal).
Organization of March events showed in opposition an institute of power that can compete at the level of state and family political institutes. However, as a result of this informal political institute the political potential of opposition in our country has a temporary character, accompanied with the absence of conceptual basis, and which is why it is not a structural institute of politics. In a situation when the powerful does not make any mistakes or looks for communication and compromises, opposition looses its energy for political confrontation.
It happened in 2006-2007, when political opposition from the powerful political movement turned into a small group of politicians who did not have an extensive support basis. Recently, the role of groups and concrete individuals –owners of large capitals or those who control financial and other resources- is becoming more important in the power relations. Here, one needs to differentiate three groups. The first is the business elite, who has formed its capital during Akaev’s rule either in the country or abroad, and now interested in retaining its capital, property or investments into the country. Usually, these are economically independent people. Forms of their participation in political life are various.
Some try to be included into political institutes by taking leading state positions or being elected to the Jogorku Kenesh. Others work openly in the format of opposition, trying to retain their capital by means of this political position. The main purpose of their participation is protection and development of their business. There is also a group – high level state officials, close to distribution of financial and other resources. They are directly incorporated into state institutes. As a rule, they worked with the former regime and continue to work with the current through technologies of bribery and other services. The third group is family business-teams- people close to relatives of high-level officials and politicians who manage their businesses and render support. These groups have certain influence on political decisions and operation of political institutes by lobbying their interests and interests of their patrons. To lesser extent but still some ideological elite groups participate in political power relations representing ideas and views of the mass. As a result of the intensified process of Kyrgyz self-identification, these groups have become quite active. However, in the political space it is not expressed sufficiently. Mainly these are groups which propose ideas of Kyrgyz originality and independent way of development.
The idea of Kyrgyz nationalism despite its growing popularity especially among youth has no clear political formulation. Several political parties which base on these ideas are weak enough and do not have effective and attractive programs. The ideas of nationalism are alive and have political effect through other public institutes – local communities, NGOs, printed media. Partially the effect of national ideas is shown in the ethnic policy of state, which definitely is heading towards mono-ethnicity. Recent changes in the election legislation which present possibilities for ethnic groups to participate in the work of the legislative body are more an exclusion rather than a rule. As a consequence, there is a very specific way of how elite of ethnic groups represented in Kyrgyzstan work with formal political institutes. The major channel of political influence and political interaction is the Assembly of Kyrgyzstan’s peoples, which uses its status of advisory council under the president to lobby ideas of ethnic development. While uniting formally national-cultural centers, the Assembly is de facto structure of political representation of ethnic communities. The efforts to organize ethnic parties are blocked by authorities. Creation of political parties along with ethnic lines is prohibited by the Constitution of the country. However, certain ethnic groups undertake some efforts to create political organizations in the hidden form to protect interests of these ethnic groups. During many years some efforts to adopt law which provide rights for ethnic groups as well as requirements to have quota for participation of different ethnic groups in the work of state agencies are not fruitful in gaining support of legislators.
The conception of ethnic policy that was adopted by the Assembly of Kyrgyzstan’s peoples two years ago has not been yet reflected in the state programs for development. It is hard to deny the fact that often subjects of political relations are criminal groups, which control certain resources and territories. Except the fact that some people connected with the criminal world might be elected to the Jogorku Kenesh, the shadow structures are used in a number of cases to influence various political forces, and their resources are applied to conduct political campaigns. However, along with consolidation of power, it is less needed to use them for political interests, and then criminal groups become objects for persecution of law-enforcing bodies. A relatively new participant in politics is professional corporations which serve politics. Among them the most active is mass media. Majority of them is financed by some political forces and positioned to protect interests of the latter. In recent years the community of experts has been formed, which actively affects political processes. At the same time, some structures even though identified as expert institutes in fact take active participation in political campaigns and advancement of certain political ideas. Thus, informal political structures and their relations play the key role in the current Kyrgyz politics. Even retaining the informal status, they are still real political institutes while formal political institutes in most cases perform decorative functions.
Valentin Bogatyrev, expert of the Institute for Public Policy, coordinator of the analytical consortium “Perspective”
