Valentin Bogatyrev: The first question to be answered is the question of elites.  

In my view, in its full meaning, only those groups or people may be regarded as part of a national elite, if they meet four major requirements: 

·          To have a vision of problems at the national level;

·          To have a vision of the future;

·          To have personal responsibility for national development;

·          To have activities targeted at the solution of the country’s problems and a realization of a vision of the future. One has to consider two major conditions.

The first: all of these requirements are essential; if one of them is absent, one should not confer the status of elite. The second condition is that the fundamental drive for creation of an elite is the acceptance and responsibility of people’s destiny. An elite is responsible for the future, since they shape it.  Thus, the parameters of an elite are taken within the national framework and and determined by their activities, but NOT by social status, the nature of their  work, ambition level, their political role or at somebody else’s behest. One can be an internationally known writer or academic,, a leader of the ruling political party, or the country’s president and still not a part of the national elite.  

According to the national tradition, a good example of this status is the figure of manap. In the society where national identity has been formed at the tribal level,, the institute of manaps were considered elite from the national viewpoint, not just tribal.  

It is understandable that when one relies on such criteria and look at those who position themselves as elite, it is hard to find even ten people who can indeed be considered as the national elite.  Sociology and political science do not have high standards in their definition of elites.

As a result, they regard those people as elite who are able somehow to influence decision-making or opinion-formation.  This interpretation implies that there are a great number of “elite” groups.

From hereon in I will use this term in quotes. The composition and method of participation of them in decision-making or opinion-formation is quite standardized. It depends on what kind of skills and capacity such people and groups have.  In today’s Kyrgyzstan, the “elite” cluster may include:

·          People who possess enough financial resources to influence decision-making or organize media activities on the national scale;

·          People who, as a result of circumstances (formal status, close relations to the clan groups involved in decision-making), are able to regulate or influence the process of regulation of financial and informational resources (all state officials are included);

·          People who belong to professional groups relevant to public opinion-formation;

·          People who start public actions (including those organized) at the expense of one’s own resources, those attendant, or foreign resources;

·          Local and regional “elites,” formed from people with a high social status and connections to the local and/or the regional identity;

·          Ethnic “elite,” leaders of ethnic groups who attained legitimacy in various ways and who are somehow capable of solving problems in their ethnic groups formally or informally;

·          Criminal “elite”; leaders of the organized criminal groups, who influence decision-making because of their connections with law-enforcing structures or people in power;

·          And, finally, the main group: people who directly participate in the preparation, discussion and undertaking of socially important decisions because of close relations to the clan groups involved in decision-making. This structure is completely different from the formal structure of state and political institutes stipulated by the Constitution and exists in reality.  

Thus, we have governance, and more broadly a social diplast. There are real and quasi-governance systems.  In the normative way, it is observed in the simultaneous existence of legal and traditional normative regulation when the unwritten or traditional law dominates. By traditional law, here, we understand not a totality of national traditions and norms, the nation’s ethical code and so on, but a system of socially-recognized norms of relations and behavior that have been formed within a certain historical period and within certain historical circumstances.

For Kyrgyz society, this historical period was the recent century and a half, with the compelling circumstances of the Russian model of social relations. In such a system, the formal norms or law acts as a quasi-regulator.  

The peculiarity of such system is that the position of certain people in formal power institutes and the governance of political subjects is not a condition that strengthens being “elite,” but a condition that formally confirms the already real status of “elite.” Power doesn’t create the “elite,” but the fact of being “elite” creates power; this maxim is true for both the real and quasi-elite. 

It is a mistake, and an unaffordable simplification, to argue that the existence of two diametrically opposing social spaces causes the alienation of “elites” from decision-making. The reality is different, and much more complex.  

Taking into account that all “elite” groups represent the interests of certain social groups, their activities are characterized as real politics more than formal political relations, which exist among the formal state institutes or officials.  The role of “elites” in decision-making thus must not be underestimated and rejected.  Another question is that in such systems or regimes (if this word is more favored by the audience) there are specific formats and mechanisms by means of which this role is realized.  

I will mention some of such specific forms.  One of them is the institute of family. By Family in this case, this includes not only the relatives of powerful people. Family is a special social conglomeration that has persistent relations based on their common interests and a high level of personal trust. Here, people and groups who are connected with the powerful by personal history are included.  

The second form is something that can be characterized as the institute of “advisors.” There is a group of people who have somehow happened to achieve the right and opportunity to form the informational space of power and propose governance policies. The composition and stability of this group is defined by the amount of informational trust in them and the effectiveness of those decisions proposed.  

The third form is “prophets” from abroad. These are people, states, international and private organizations, which have the “truth effect” and trust potential based on authority or power (military, financial, informational and so on).  The forth form is the public action initiative. The spectrum of tools here is quite wide, from meetings and protests to initiating national programs.  The fifth form is the public outbreak of “elites.”

Examples of such a format of influence on political decision-making are the methods of Dr. Nazaraliev, or public speeches of Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, or the opposition press. It has to be pointed out that as a result of low recognition of the role of this “elite,” this method is of low effectiveness.  All five forms of “elites” in political decision-making  I have sequenced according to their impact on the process of decision-making: from the most effective to the least.  All “elite” groups that can be distinguished in our country, without exception, use all mechanisms and channels to influence political decision-making.