Seventeen years after the December day in Belovejskaya Pusha, when the leaders of three Soviet republics of the USSR signed an agreement on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the question of what the CIS is, remains unanswered. The future of this organization also seems unpredictable, because for more than fifteen years, it is comprised of countries that have nothing in common, except for the fact that they were all former republics of the Soviet Union; an organization that is no longer in existence.  

Birth injuries of the CIS

The most crucial paradox of the Commonwealth of Independent States lies in the fact that it was created not for, but against something:  against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The agreement on the Establishment of the CIS on December 8, 1991, began with the following words: "We, the Republic of Belarus, Russian Federation (RSFSR) and Ukraine as the founding nations of the USSR who signed the Union Treaty in 1922, ascertain that the Soviet Union ceases to exist as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality."

This was something which should have been said and in the early years of the CIS the public didn’t pay attention to it.  However, later when V. Putin said that the CIS was created for “civilized divorce”, he revealed the basic intention of the CIS founding fathers in this famour phrase.

There is nothing terrible or indecent that the CIS would become a framework for divorce of the former Soviet republics. Indeed, all the republics of the former USSR (except Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) became members of this organization.  The founding of the CIS allowed for the resolution of urgent issues related to borders, mutual obligations, debts, etc. without shocks and severe conflicts. Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States in that sense was an extremely important decision. Thanks to that, division of the former Soviet republics passed smoothly and did not lead to profound geopolitical turmoil.

However, the problem was that the organization, established with disintegration aims, has been doing exactly the opposite all these years, trying to re-assemble a country that fall apart. Based on an assumption from the past, rather than the future, as it has become clear today,  the countries who signed the treaty have deep historical ties, common economic interests, social obligations and so forth.   It was concluded that member states of the former Soviet Union would implement measures for cooperation on a wide range of problems facing the member countries of the agreement.

This conclusion has been historically proven wrong. Furthermore, the course of events in the former Soviet Union has showed that “historical ties” were, for the most part, historical conflicts; “common economic interests”, resulted in tough economic competition; “common” social obligations, became problems of each country individually; and many of the countries still do not want to recognize their responsibility for the social obligations of the former USSR.

The confession by Vyacheslav Igrunov, a Russian politician who worked as a Vice-Chairman on CIS Affairs in the State Duma of Russia, became momentous: “For me the CIS is such an important thing, because I have worked so hard, for example, to create a Committee on CIS Affairs in the State Duma. I succeeded and tried to do something with my own hands, however, I only saw it all go in pieces and scatter”. And further: “... the CIS stopped existing and, frankly, it had never existed. It was not able to provide a mechanism for multilateral post-Soviet coexistence”. (1)

Another birth injuries the consequences of which the CIS has not overcome until now, was that the decision to create the CIS as a separate, backstage treaty between only three republics. No matter what the leaders of the other states said in the past nor how hard they tried to save their faces, the Almaty agreement only confirmed the fact that one group has made the decision regarding creation of CIS and others had to join it.  It also confirmed that the CIS was  a Commonwealth of independent states, but they were not equal states.  
But this is not the most surprising story related to the birth of the CIS. Few people today know that one of the founders of the CIS, Ukraine, did not sign and ratify the Statute of the CIS, which once allowed the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk even to say that Ukraine was not a member of the CIS. (2)

Ukraine was a founding state of the CIS. At the same time, I would like to recall that Ukraine is not a member of the CIS, since it did not sign and ratify the statute of the CIS.

The post-Soviet fears of supranational structures shared by the CIS founders and member states have also played a negative role. No one wanted a repetition of the union treaty and the creation of the union state. Nobody wanted to cede, at least, part of the sovereignty. This was reflected in the principles of the new organization.

The CIS was a very amorphous entity from the very beginning. Procedure for enforcing the decisions of its higher authorities did not work well. A regulating document under the title of "Rules of the Procedure" says nothing about compulsory enforcement of decisions and about sanctions for the failure of implementation, etc. On the contrary, it stated that the decisions of the Council of heads of states are made up by consensus. And, at the same time, the article states, "any member state may declare its disinterest in any matter, which will not impede taking the decision". Thus, each state within the CIS has its own policy, which depends on the currently prevailing political and economic circumstances, and is free to change its position once the need arises. That is why the decisions have almost never been enforced; the effective work of the CIS bodies is extremely low. During this time, the Commonwealth set up 70 councils, but "almost none of them works", as Nursultan Nazarbayev observed during a CIS summit in Astana. “The CIS Economic Court took only four decisions but no one pays attention to them”, he added. Very few of the hundreds of agreements, signed since 1991, have been enforced. (3)

But, perhaps, the greatest negative effect of “anti-Soviet” creation of the CIS was that the organization had no positive idea or common understanding of what was the true purpose of the Commonwealth of Independent States. (4) When, after more than twelve years of the organization’s existence, one of the leaders of its member states exclaims: "We should finally decide what we really want from the CIS." (5) It is a very interesting and significant statement.

There can be no doubt that the participating countries have no sense of the mission of the CIS or a sense of belonging to one community. The CIS is not built on a common understanding of the global worldview, economic order, human rights, standards of democracy, etc. The Commonwealth of Independent States did not exist as a civilization, economic, political or cultural project since its birth and does not exist as such now.
For the Kyrgyz Republic, integration with the CIS was a matter of not only traditional foreign policy orientation, although this has undoubtedly played a big role. There were several factors that made it impossible for any other choice. Economic issues were among these factors. At that time, Kyrgyzstan belonged to the ruble currency area. Its economy was linked by thousands of threads with the economies of Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Preservation of a unified, visa-free travel space was of enormous economic and humanitarian importance. In addition, Kyrgyzstan remained in the same information space. In this sense, choosing the CIS as a framework for international communications was predetermined for the country, and therefore, it was not an act of a free and independent decision.

More contradictions than agreement

Meanwhile, it became clear almost immediately after the formation of independent states that the only thing uniting the countries of the CIS is the fact that they emerged on the ruins of the Soviet Union. At the same time, there is a huge list of differences between them.

Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, having significant natural resources, are much richer than Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which cannot boast of rich natural resources. Taking into account the resource basis and ideology, various countries of the CIS began pursuing various economic models. Already these circumstances made it extremely difficult or even impossible to harmonize the modes of economic cooperation, customs and tax rules.

Differences in economic models and economic policies have gone so far that the Kyrgyz Republic was able to join the WTO first and follow the rules, which were unacceptable to other countries at that time and largely remain unacceptable today.

Another significant divisive factor was that the many economic ties, existing earlier between the republics within the framework as one national economy, were broken. Like many of the other countries, Kyrgyzstan, ,did not have a self suffiecient economy but served as “one of the workshops”. As a result, this meant stopping virtually all major industries. It became clear already at that time that the CIS was unable to resolve this key issue for the survival of the country.

We cannot say, however, that the CIS did not make efforts to solve this problem. In September 1993, heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States signed the Treaty establishing an Economic Union, which had the concept of transforming the economic interaction within the Commonwealth of Independent States, taking into account the existing realities.

The Treaty was based on the parties’ understanding of the need to create a common economic space: on the free movement of goods, services, labor and capital; on developing a coherent monetary, taxation, pricing, customs and foreign economic policy; on a common regulation of economic activities; and on the creation of a favorable environment for the development of direct economic ties.

Georgia and Turkmenistan became its full members in December 1993, and Ukraine joined the Economic Union as an associate member on 15 April, 1994.

But even today, many years after the treaty was signed, a single economic space of the CIS does not exist. National interests, the interests of national economies of member countries of the Commonwealth are higher than the need for integration.

Of course, being a member of the CIS allowed a number of countries, including the Kyrgyz Republic, to enjoy for quite a long time the regime of reduced prices for energy resources supplied by other member countries of the Commonwealth. This was essential, not only for development, but also for the very survival of Kyrgyzstan in the post-Soviet period.

Nevertheless, it was obvious that this situation could not have lasted long. Many, especially in Russia, felt that it made no sense to support this kind of relations with the countries of the CIS. Russia had been selling its raw materials for "domestic" low prices, constantly writing off various debts and providing other expensive services. Obviously, by doing so, Russia bought the loyalty of its neighbors by engaging in barter relationship with them - you are loyal to us, and we sell “cheap” oil and gas to you. For a time, the scheme was working. However, the situation began to change. The laws of market economy were tough, and the price issue was pressing. First, the countries who had political disagreements with Russia, and then all the others, were forced to buy energy resources at market prices.

Relations between Kyrgyzstan with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which supplied Kyrgyzstan with oil, gas and coal, were also similar. For a long time, the price was reduced. Today, however, the situation is different.

Thus, there are fewer and fewer economic reasons the Kyrgyz Republic to stay in the CIS.

Politically, the CIS is also very diversified. Several countries focus on democratic development, while the others prefer “sovereign democracy”, or even authoritarian regimes.　Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic are oriented towards Western democracy and would not object their admission to various international organizations, whose membership is difficult to combine with membership in the CIS.

In these circumstances, the attempts to turn the CIS into an instrument of legitimizing political regimes are natural. The phenomenon of “CIS observers”, who are ready to recognize any election in any member country of the Commonwealth democratic, has become notorious. It was also difficult to hide the desire to use the CIS to counter the “Western democracy” or “the Western information war” against, let’s say, Belarus or Russia.

The political map of the CIS today still looks so much like patch work, that it has become clear: the integrated political space in the CIS does not exist. In this regard, comparison with Europe draws a dramatic picture. There are also great differences between the countries and groups of countries. But fundamentally, they all belong to a united world, the world of western democracy. To what does the CIS belong to is extremely difficult to say.

To characterize the relations within the CIS, two illustrative examples should be considered. One relates to Ukraine. Ukraine’s grudge against the CIS raised the question of recognizing, by the Commonwealth countries, the Famine of 1932-1933 as an act of genocide. The Council of Ministers of the CIS rejected the proposal, although four delegations, namely of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, supported it. The five representatives of Foreign Ministers who voted against it were from Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The three heads of foreign ministries who abstained were from Kazakhstan, Armenia and Turkmenistan. According to the Ukrainian side, those who did not support this decision, not only showed indifference to the great tragedy of the Ukrainian people, but also refused to give a signal to the world that the CIS would never tolerate flagrant mass violations of human rights and totalitarianism.

Many other initiatives by Ukraine were not supported either, such as: pensions for citizens of the CIS countries, an integrated readmission area, transporting corridors and transportation of energy resources, realization of the idea of a free trade zone and the borders issues.

Another example is very recent - the Russian-Georgian conflict.

The CIS has always been an organization with considerable contradictions among its members. Armenia and Azerbaijan are separated by the Karabakh problem, three-year Karabakh war, unresolved situation and diametrically opposed positions. There is a very serious competition for the leadership in Central Asia between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. There are disagreements between Russia and Georgia, between Russia and Ukraine over the issue of fleet based in Sevastopol, between Russia and Moldova over Trans-Dniester etc. As well, there is a serious discourse between the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan over the water resources. One should also bear in mind the unresolved border problem between some countries of the CIS.

All of these issues have never found solutions within the framework of the CIS. Moreover, they have not even been raised.

Article 3 of the Statute of the Commonwealth of Independent States implies the respect for the sovereignty of member states, the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination and the right to control their destiny without external interference, the inviolability of state borders, recognition of existing borders and rejection of illegal territorial gains, the territorial integrity of the states and refraining from any actions aimed at breaking up of someone else's territory, non-use of force or threat of force against the political independence of member states, the resolution of disputes by peaceful means so as not to endanger international peace, security and justice.

In the case of the Russian-Georgian conflict, all these provisions of the Statute of the CIS were violated. None of the countries participating in the conflict thought to address the CIS to resolve the conflict.  Article 17 of the Statute of the CIS, stipulates that the Commonwealth member states would refrain from actions that could harm the other member states and exacerbate possible disputes, member states would make cooperation efforts for a just and peaceful settlement of their disputes through negotiations or agreements, according to appropriate alternative dispute settlement procedure. If member states cannot solve the dispute by the means indicated in part two of this article, they might readdress it to the Council of heads of the states. None of these have been done. Moreover, none of the countries of the CIS, including the Kyrgyz Republic, which at that time chaired the CIS, was even informed about the armed resolution of the conflict prepared by the two sides. This demonstrates not only the absence within the CIS framework of necessary mechanisms and procedures of action in such cases, but the absolute disregard by both Georgia and Russia for their partners in the Commonwealth. A more convincing demonstration of the true role and significance of the CIS is difficult to imagine.

Among geopolitical consequences of the Russian-Georgian conflict, a change in the attitudes towards Russia by other member countries of the CIS should be obvious. For the first time, Russia demonstrated that it is ready to act and even use military force to retain or regain its influence in the territories considered necessary. Moreover, it has actually declared South Ossetia and Abkhazia a zone of its influence, saying that “Russia has historically been the guarantor of security in the Caucasus.” It is clear that nothing can prevent it from declaring Central Asia, Baltic and other countries a historical zone of its influence. This raises serious concerns in the capitals of all post-Soviet states. It is also disturbing that Russia set a precedent of interference in the affairs of another country, using military actions, under the pretext of protecting the interests of its citizens. 
 
In other neighboring countries, and generally in the post-Soviet space, there are a lot of people with Russian passports. This makes it possible for Russia to use “Russian compatriots” as a pretext for any kind of interference in the affairs of other states, including territorial claims. Recognition of legality of such actions and even the precedent of their possibility can be directly applied to the situation with Russian citizens in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic; or Uzbek, Chinese and Kazakh citizens in the Kyrgyz Republic and so on.

The Russian-Georgian conflict has shown that Russia has a growing desire and capacity to resist western policy in the post-Soviet space.

Therefore, Russia seeks to strengthen its influence in the CIS area to keep the post-Soviet space under its control.

It should be noted that the leadership of the Kyrgyz Republic has always taken up a rather vague position in this kind of conflicts. It has either taken the side of Russia, as it did in the case with Ukraine (although Kyrgyzstan had a similar problem with Russia in its history - the mass killing of people in 1916), or it followed a tactic of non-interference and non-explicit expression of its view, as in the case of the Russian-Georgian conflict.

Nevertheless, one could see some dynamics towards independent position of the Kyrgyz Republic since its leadership in the latter case did not recognize independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, despite strong pressure. Of course, it was not connected with the position of neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, who recognized the leadership of Georgia guilty in the conflict but clearly refused to support Russia on the issue of recognizing the parts of Georgian territories as independent states.

Thus, we see that we cannot speak about a unified policy of the CIS. The Commonwealth of Independent States is a highly controversial organization having internal conflicts; moreover, it does not have mechanisms for resolving these conflicts. And even if the CIS remains after the last conflict, it will be worth it, at least, to change its name, since it cannot be called “Commonwealth” any longer.

Defending the CIS

Problems and contradictions existing in the CIS do not mean that there is no area where this kind of interaction could benefit all the member countries.

There is no doubt that, establishing the CIS, leaders in the former Soviet republics had an intuitive awareness of the need to preserve economic integration, centuries-old cultural interpenetration, close human contact, a sense of unity to work together in meeting the challenges of development and to repel external threats.

In today's world, countries objectively seek integration. In this process, one may find many points of intersection of mutual interests.

First of all, let us consider the economic field. The most important area where the interests of the CIS countries meet and often clash is the energy. The states exporting oil and gas still often act as competitors in terms of the access to the world market. This situation allows external forces to manipulate the energy levers in the CIS region that is unlikely to be of benefit for all. There may be only one decision in this situation: clear policy coordination in this field is required.

Only through joint efforts can we solve one of the most acute problems of the post-Soviet region: weak labor markets. Russia can, and should, tighten the migration legislation and its methods to combat illegal labor migration. Through inter-state mechanisms of cooperation between partners, the CIS is able to seriously and comprehensively deal with the problems of the labor markets structuring.  As a result, this would create additional jobs in those countries which produce the most intense flows of migrant workers. To a large extent, it is also a problem of big corporations and businesses that rely heavily on migrant labor, including illegal laborers. If this problem is solved in a civilized manner and, most importantly, in a spirit of mutual respect, such a phenomenon of unwanted "guest workers", humiliating national dignity, will disappear by itself over time.

Consolidation and expansion of military integrity and cooperation of member countries of the CIS is of particular importance today. The Commonwealth remains a unique mechanism of improving this interaction for the benefit of each country and, at the same time, for protecting common interests. There is no need to prove the advisability of integration in the military field: it should be done for maintaining the territorial integrity and protection from terrorist and other external threats. Sovereign rights of possession and disposition of natural resources, control over transport infrastructure, vital for members of the Commonwealth, ensuring free access to the world's water routes and other issues are no less significant.

An enduring value that unites all the countries of the CIS, including even the current EU members - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, - is a common cultural space. Unfortunately, it was also seriously affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union. But even today, the current "Europeans" - the Baltic states - still live predominantly in the cultural space of Russia and the CIS.  Their cultural potential (music, theater, cinema) is demanded mainly here.

And, finally, among the common cultural and humanitarian values of the CIS is the Russian language. Recognizing the value of all the national languages, which certainly must hold leading positions in their countries, we cannot fail to note: the Russian language is a great world language, a part of the universal heritage, a universal means of inter-ethnic and inter-state communication. (6) 

 The CIS: future scenarios

Undoubtedly, the Commonwealth of Independent States has a future full of problems, which stems not only from the problematic past, but also on the historical choice of each of the countries belonging to the organization.

Today, the CIS is open to various future scenarios.

Scenario 1. Club of leaders

Perhaps, the most common scenario is the one that gives the Commonwealth of Independent States the role of a club of leaders. Many experts believe that the CIS will not be taken seriously for a quite long period of time by most of its participants and other countries. The reason is that the CIS has no clear objective, and it has not achieved the objectives it had. 
Specific projects largely remained on paper. So far, a free trade zone has not been established, and the only achievement of the CIS in the field of economics is an integral customs space; which only five states have joined. The Collective Security Treaty is going through difficult times, and the experts are frequently saying that it is becoming invalid. The CIS Anti-Terrorist Center, on whose establishment Russia has long insisted, was not created, like many other initiatives of the commonwealth.

At the same time, the main sense of the CIS existence, according to experts, is in regular meetings of the leaders of 12 nations. It seems that this is the most convenient excuse for confidential talks., In the opinion of Zatulin, the director of the CIS countries Institute, the CIS could be a forum for expressing different ideas. (7)

The increase in the number of informal meetings of leaders of the CIS member states speaks in favor of that scenario. They have become not only regular, but also very important in terms of clarifying the views and coordination of positions.  They have now become ritualistic and even private in nature; being timed to birthdays of the leaders.

Such a format is certainly convenient for the leaders, because it does not bind them with obligations, it does not require careful and difficult work and it creates a sense of team. At the same time, the format of multilateral consultations helps find ways for future bilateral agreements and accords.

However, it has its drawbacks. The main drawback is that no noticeable changes occur in the relations between countries, and in solving the existing problems after such meetings.

Scenario 2. European Union

Perhaps, that is why the leaders of many countries are not satisfied with the current status and the manner of running business in the CIS. There have been numerous attempts to change the status quo. The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, made the most systemic attempt by offering to reorganize the CIS.

According to his concept, it is necessary to make the CIS decisions obligatory to implement. There should be no such states, which sign the documents but do not comply with the relevant decisions.

Among new things that should be in focus for the CIS proposed by Nazarbayev, is a common approach to international affairs, and, moreover, a common space of defense policy.

It is clear that this is a very different model of interstate union, similar to how the European Union is organized.

Apparently, if this reorganization does take place, it will certainly result in a significant change among the members. The case could be that the space of the CIS competence will completely coincide with the space of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Given that the actors of the CSTO, and, first of all, its bureaucracy, recently have been persistently seeking to expand the powers and competences of the organization, this development is likely to take place.

A negative impact of this scenario could be the apparent decline in the number of participants, and thus in the space of possible political action. Many opportunities for the countries remaining in this union will be lost forever.

In this scenario, it is unclear how participating countries will also be participants of the SCO, the OSCE, European Union and even NATO, since many member countries of the CIS are also bound by other obligations. It is unlikely that they want to make substantial concessions in their international relations in favor of the hypothetical benefits that the reorganized CIS might promise. So far, the entire experience of the CIS proves its nearly absolute inefficiency.

Scenario 3. The Soviet Union

Today there is much more evidence of another trend of the CIS – movement towards an organization reminiscent of the Soviet Union.

Many experts believe that the CIS, by its idea and its nature, is nothing else but the community of Soviet people. It can be considered as some involuntary jump back to something habitual, to a form that had previously existed.

The key question here is returning to the model, in which Russia dominates in the CIS. Some experts believe that this process is well on its way; there is a new bolshevist occupation of the territory, if I may say so, the only difference is that it is an absolute occupation in the realities of market.

 Vitaly Tretyakov, responding to the question “Why CIS?”, presented the position the most clearly (8). He said explicitly that Russia is interested in certain integration in the post-Soviet space, because in this integration, it automatically becomes its leader anyway, even if it does not claim Russia's role as a leader, simply due to its geopolitical weight, territory and other things. Russia has vital interests in this space: strategic, operational and tactical interests. Also it has interests in the fields of geopolitics, simple politics, military, humanitarian, and only as a last resort, in the economic areas.

Tretyakov told an almost expansionist idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed all the countries that emerged in the post-Soviet space to receive larger territories than those, with which they once entered the Russian Empire; except for Russia itself. And the point is not in the loss of square kilometers of land.  Today, Russia has more than anyone else. The point is that Russia lost some natural frontiers, which had provided military and strategic security of the country. The most striking examples are the loss of full-scale maritime border on the Black Sea and of general control over the Black Sea basin. The western border was moved a thousand kilometers deep into the territory of the country. And these are only two examples.

In order to preserve the integrity and security for all the nations living throughout its territory, as well as to ensure the rights of 20 million Russians living outside their homeland, Russia must either provide sound prospects for the stability in the post-Soviet space, (retaining the loyalty of newly independent states for Russia itself and respect for the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens in these states), or to restore a new basis for the unity of traditional geo-strategic space; which is safe because of its natural canonical space of Greater Russia (i.e. the Russian Empire / Soviet Union).  These are the aims of which the CIS now serves. However, the CIS is only a transitional inter-state organization.

It is clear that we are talking about moving to another organization, which is described as the following: “there may be only one strategic goal of Russia in the post-Soviet space, and this goal is the reunion of the most natural and inevitable configuration of Greater Russia, which includes all the key geo-strategic areas to ensure stability and security of the space. This configuration may replace the CIS or co-exist with it.  The core of this configuration should become the Russian Union, uniting several key countries of the region in one state on the basis of confederation or federation. Besides Russia, it must embrace, at least, one state in the West, in the Caucasus and Central Asia”. (9)

It is easy to understand, which countries in Central Asia are at stake. These are Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, which have Russian military bases on their territories. In such a scenario, Uzbekistan’s or Kazakhstan's entry into the “Greater Russia” is not necessary. They will be gripped in a “vice”, and their policy will be fully controlled by Russia. Clearly, efforts towards such a scenario are being made within the CSTO to establish the so-called “Central Asian group”.

It is also clear that for the Kyrgyz Republic such a scenario would mean total loss of sovereignty and of the opportunity to design its own development, or what might be called a repetition of 1863. 

 Scenario 4. Dissolution of the CIS

In connection with the Russian-Georgian conflict and the statement of Georgia about withdrawal from the CIS, as well as the position of Ukraine, the question of possibility of the CIS dissolution became more urgent than ever.

This question is not new. It was raised more than once at various levels, including even the president of Russia, leaders of other countries, not to mention experts who had repeatedly predicted the end of the CIS. If the question is put into practice, no one will be surprised. For Russia and other member countries of this organization, the CIS has become an image of a suitcase without a handle – which is inconvenient to carry but is a pity to get rid of

But the question is not so simple as it seems, because it is difficult to to analyze what the CIS does. Dissolution of the CIS would cause far greater consequences than its operation.

First of all, there will be a certain political vacuum in the huge space, and it will take time to restructure international relations between the countries concerned. This can be very dangerous in terms of stability and security in some of the states, including the Kyrgyz Republic. Some experts believe that a few large-scale armed conflicts or even wars are a possibility. Such a threat, of course, exists; albeit one should not exaggerate it. For example, surely the dissolution of the CIS could lead to worsening relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and even between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, not to mention the Caucasus. There is a high probability of recurrence of the armed conflicts around the four unrecognized states existing in the CIS - Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Trans-Dniester. Six of the twelve countries of the dissolved Commonwealth will be drawn in these conflicts.

The forecast saying that some countries, whom NATO and the European Union will not find necessary to urgently invite, will either collapse or become part of other states, is hardly realistic. The projection that some leaders may be removed and civil wars will break out is not realistic either.

An absolutely predictable dilemma is that there will be problems with visa-free movement over the territory of the former CIS. New flows of migrants are also probable.

The danger of conflicts in neighboring countries would lead to hardening positions of Russia. Russia may be drawn into the resolution of these conflicts – especially when it comes to those, whom Russia calls today ''Russian compatriots'' in other countries.

But, at the same time, there are many people who believe that the collapse of the CIS would not entail any problems. On the contrary, it would have a beneficial impact on the situation in the current CIS member countries. 
 

***
There is no necessity to make a final diagnosis on the Commonwealth of Independent States. Some believe that this diagnosis has been made long time ago. The fact that during every meeting, the heads of the states give orders to reform the commonwealth is eloquent evidence that the Commonwealth does not perform the role entrusted to it. Other evidence is the new projects and new ideas in the Commonwealth. These are the customs union, which does not work, and the Eurasian Economic Community, which does not work either. In general, all these initiatives caused dissatisfaction among the CIS member states. As a result, regional organizations are emerging. This process has proven the erosion of the CIS as an institution.

But there are also other scenarios and another future. The potential for cooperation of the former Soviet Union countries is far from exhausted. Which of these scenarios becomes reality will be shown only by time and history.

For the Kyrgyz Republic, the question is not how to leave or to stay in the CIS. The main thing is in its selection of a position and policy, which would make participation in this international organization beneficial in terms of national interests of our country, contribution to its development and strengthened collaboration and partnership with other countries.

In any case, we cannot accept the scenarios where participation in the CIS would lead the country’s loss of sovereignty, engaging in somebody else's geopolitical games and confrontation with whomever it may be.

Valentin Bogatyrev,

Coordinator of the Analytical consortium ''Perspective'',

Institute of Public Policy Expert

[1] Interview on the Eho Moskvy radio on the topic “What is the CIS?”, February 3, 2003 www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/21176/

[2] Press conference given by the Minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine Boris Tarasyuk, April 21, 2006, RIA Novosti.  Full version available at: http://dialogs.org.ua/ua/issue_full.php?m_id=6898

[4] Alexander Babakov, leader of the Rodina faction in the State Duma, secretary of the Central Council Presidum of Spravedlivaya Rossiya party “CIS- What is next?” http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20061207/56604633.html.

[5] Robert Kocharyan, the President of Armenia.  Statement made at a final press-conference after the CIS summit in Astana.   Rossiyakaya Gazeta  (Federal issue ) №3581 September 17, 2004  

[6] Alexander Babakov, leader of Rodina fraction in the State Duma, secretary of the Central Council Presidum of Spravedlivaya Rossiya party “The CIS- What is next?” http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20061207/56604633.html.

[7] “CIS has birth marks of disintegration” Political news agency.  June 22, 2001 www.expert.org.ua/2001/06/23/010623p3.shtml

[8]  Vitaliy Tretyakov “Why do we need the CIS?”  http://www.nigru.ru/docs/8/447.html

[9] ibid