Analysis of our cooperation with the European Union leaves several conflicting feelings. In general, one may understand the imbalance in the relations: the logic of the existing “donor-client” cooperation and the negative balance of trade. However, the absence of any significant results from the partnership leaves a mixed impression. According to the EU Commission, during the 10-year period of 1996-2006, Kyrgyzstan received aid amounting to 132.9 million Euros.  This aid came within the framework of European programs such as TACIS and “Food security”. In 2007-2013 the EU Assistance Strategy Paper plans to allocate 55 million Euros only for the needs of Kyrgyzstan and 94.2 million for the implementation of regional initiatives with the participation of Kyrgyzstan.[1] Thus, the real reasons for choosing the “European vector” by Kyrgyzstan are obvious.

 

A quick tour through the history of the Kyrgyz-European relations again brings us to the same question: “So what has been achieved?” Do we actively use the trade preferences in economic relations with the European countries? Has the Bologna Process been successfully introduced in higher education? Do our citizens easily receive the Schengen Visas? And, finally, do our planes fly over European space?

 

A main factor in evaluating any policy is its effectiveness. How does one evaluate the effectiveness of the partnership with the EU? Simply summing up loans, grants, technical and humanitarian assistance from the EU for the past 15 years will lead us only to the fact that Kyrgyzstan, among all Central Asian countries, received more European aid per capita. Analyzing political cooperation shows that Kyrgyzstan participated in regular meetings, where they usually discussed the same issues in the following order: “The EU asks questions and Kyrgyzstan answers them. The trade balance analysis does not favor a balanced and differential cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the EU either. What about the projects of the EU Commission? All these expensive initiatives bear long and serious names, but there have not been any major changes in economy and institutional regulation, the rule of law, policies against drug trafficking and border management.

 

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the European policy, Kyrgyzstan must evaluate the domestic situation and the situation in the EU. It would seem, as a full partner of the European Union, along with the universal Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU and its member countries, in addition to the European presence in the region, Kyrgyzstan should already have sufficient elements for a productive and dynamic cooperation in all the spheres. So what prevents us from being more efficient?

 

INSTITUTIONAL MISUNDERSTANDING

 

The institutional labyrinth, formed within the structures of the European Union during more than fifty years of the integration process, is a major obstacle to the full understanding of EU mechanisms not only for EU partners, but also for EU members themselves. Mixing the supranational principle and intergovernmental arrangements further complicates the perception of a coherent picture of the European Union as an international partner. Nation-states accustomed to a certain style of international relations usually get lost when they have to deal with the European Union structures. Different procedure of decision-making in the EU does not make defining strategy towards the EU clear for Kyrgyzstan either.

 

For example, it is well known that many experts in Kyrgyzstan often confuse the Council of Europe, an international organization focusing on human rights and international law, and the European Council (also known as the EU Council), the chief legislative body of the European Union. The main characteristic of the European Council is its multi-structure: in fact, it consists of 9 specialized councils, composed of the relevant national ministers of the EU member-states. The European Council determines the long-term political line throughout the EU. It makes decisions on the basis of the intergovernmental principle, which means that a decision taken by the Council reflects the common will of the entire “Europe 27”, often reached by consensus.

 

An executive body of the European Union is the European Commission, which implements its activities on the supranational principle, guaranteeing the realization of not national but European interests. In the relations with partners, including Kyrgyzstan, it is the Commission, which coordinates the assistance and support to development.  The Commission represents the  “face” and “generous hand” of Europe.

 

The European Parliament, a part of the “European institutional triangle” - Council, Commission and Parliament – has also played an important role. Unfortunately, external partners of the EU underestimate the significance of the European Parliament because its deputies have a advisory role in all areas except the budgetary matters. However, the European Parliament is a real parliament formed by direct election rather than an assembly; consisting of representatives of national parliaments. This is why it plays an important role in shaping the integrated European public opinion; which is crucial in the context of the emerging unified European political parties.

 

Thus, it is clear that building an effective partnership with the EU requires full cooperation on all three “fronts” - the intergovernmental Council, whose decisions may be dependent on the national interests of a member country that is chairing in the Council (currently the Council is chaired by France); the supranational Commission representing an integral European approach and controlling substantial financial resources of the Union; and the Parliament, which considerably influences the shaping of public opinion.  A good example of this is the economic sanctions used against Uzbekistan.[2]

 

Half-year terms of presidency of the EU member states, to some extent, serve as a litmus test for external and internal EU policies. Rotating presidency in the EU allows its members to bring their national interests into the common European line. For example, Luxembourg prioritized finalizing the new version of the Lisbon process, the chief economic indicator in the EU, while Austria and Finland looked at the Balkans, the issue of which has been forgotten lately. In 2007, taking advantage of this status, Germany managed to get the approval of the EU Strategy in Central Asia –  a document which brought Central Asia into view from the perspective of European foreign policy. The strategy will be discussed further in this article.

 

However, bearing in mind that six months is a very short period for implementation of decisions, it is logical to call into question the continuity of priorities. For instance, Portugal and Slovenia who chaired respectively in the second half of 2007 and first half of 2008, were unable (or unwilling) to move forward in the policy initiated by Germany concerning rapprochement with Central Asia. In this context, our expectations of the EU were apparently too high.

 

REGULATORY DISORDER

 

The institutional complexity of the European Union and its changing geometry should not be misleading for us. Instead, we should take this situation for the benefit of our national interests. Unfortunately, today, we cannot talk of the high level of implementation of PCA, which causes the question – “Do we really want to cooperate with the EU?” If so, we must determine what we want from this cooperation. The best solution might be a strategy to adopt the EU for a specific term, which would draw Kyrgyzstan’s clear vision of a future partnership with the EU with specific plans and objectives. The very elaboration of such a document would force us to rethink the European direction of our policy in accordance with today’s fashionable pragmatism.

 

Since the cooperation with European institutions is not confined to one or two areas, it is vital to coordinate Kyrgyzstan’s policies regarding the EU and the assistance received from the EU. A commonly coordinated policy of all government agencies involved, and their interaction in the form of a special working group with the EU, would yield positive results for Kyrgyzstan. Perhaps, it would be appropriate to appoint a special representative or coordinator (with a special office) for European affairs (in response to the appointment of the EU special representative for Central Asia in 2005). In this regard, it is important to train special personnel. There are about 40 universities specialized in humanities in Kyrgyzstan but none of them has an educational program of European Studies. European Studies is one of the most popular programs in the world.

 

Considering the EU as a constant player in its foreign policy, Kyrgyzstan, sometimes behaves irresponsibly in its relations with Europe. The existing PCA between Kyrgyzstan and the EU takes second place after association agreements in the hierarchy of the European norms in regards to external relations. Comprehensiveness and universality of the PCA guarantees virtually inexhaustible potential for cooperation in diverse fields: from the reforms in the energy sector and strengthening the borders to the cooperation in education and culture.

 

Despite the fact that the PCA provides an excellent framework for developing bilateral cooperation, it is necessary to make some adjustments to this Agreement. Since the term of the PCA expires in 2009, it is desirable to begin negotiations on a new agreement now. This would not only give a new political weight to Kyrgyzstan's partnership with the EU but also filled it with specific content, corresponding to the national interests of the country. Regarding the trade and economic ties, it would be necessary to legally confirm the list of goods imported from Kyrgyzstan, which are subject to trade preferences. It is not well known that Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the world, which is allowed to export honey, racehorses and yak meat into the territory of the European Union. Given the protectionist agricultural policies of the EU vis-à-vis third countries, the failure to use such preferences by Kyrgyzstan, especially when the problem is only in meeting the sanitary standards, is irresponsible. Including these provisions in the new edition of PCA would benefit national interests.

 

The latest agreement between Kyrgyzstan and the EU signed in 2007 deals with cooperation in air traffic. Though the agreement corresponds, first of all, to European interests, Kyrgyzstan could try to take out its  domestic civil aviation from all kinds of blacklists with the help of this agreement.

 

THE EUROPEAN STRATEGY ON CENTRAL ASIA: BEFORE AND AFTER

 

The EU strategy on new partnership with Central Asia approved in the summer of 2007 was a result of relevant initiatives under the German presidency in the European Union. The strategy was welcomed both in the EU and in the countries concerned. The document was to create a platform for European policy on Central Asia within the European Neighborhood Policy.  It provides for close cooperation in all fields with all neighboring nations. By adopting this strategy, the European Union made an attempt to establish a permanent political partnership and highlighted the symbolic importance of this new phase of cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and the EU. The strategy was adopted in proper time, taking into account the completion of the TACIS program and the introduction of a new tool for aiding the development in Central Asia.

 

In the spirit of previous European strategies (with regard to Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean), the Central Asian Strategy is a universal framework document, which outlines the scope of possible practical cooperation on the basis of generally accepted principles and values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights. The document suggests using a number of instruments, both traditional (the institute of the EU Special Representative, mechanisms for the grant assistance and cooperation with other international actors) and innovative ones (e.g. introduction of the so-called “EU initiatives” in many different areas and use of the “intense dialogue”, particularly in the field of human rights and energy).

 

A constructive element of the Strategy is its formal recognition of the two-level nature of the EU policy towards the region: an individual bilateral approach and a common regional approach to meet the demands of the region. The policy has two parallel goals: recognition of the uniqueness of each country and,  the development of regional projects to strengthen integration among the countries. Another characteristic of the Strategy is the application of the so-called “enhanced approach” in several areas of cooperation, from democratization to environmental issues. In this approach the EU assumes the obligations to develop, promote and support specific proposals (e.g. the creation of a unified energy system in the region).

 

An attractive feature of the Strategy is its non-aggressive characteristic. Central Asia is seen as an area where the interests of international and regional actors overlap. Obviously, in this context, the Europeans stand for cooperation, not rivalry. This is demonstrated in their intention to establish contacts with regional organizations such as EurAsEC, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Another positive aspect is that the EU considers Central Asia as an element necessary for European security. In this sense, the EU is interested to have at its border, an integrated and loyal Central Asia sharing European values. The increasing role of energy in the region and its geopolitical location are also in the interest of the EU.

 

However, even taking into account all the positive innovations, the main advantage of the Strategy is its very existence. A lively discourse, preceding the adoption of the Strategy both in Central Asia and in the EU, demonstrated the mutual interest in a more dynamic and meaningful relationship between the two regions. The Strategy adoption will certainly encourage both sides and become a constructive foundation for the development of medium-term cooperation in virtually all directions.

 

Due to its unilateral dynamics, the Strategy is primarily aimed at achieving the EU objectives, while the Central Asian tasks are secondary. The document in its nature is only a declaration of principles and intentions. The Strategy is cumbersome because of its clear prioritizing of certain areas; reflected in the “enhanced approach” to the countries of Central Asia. An absolute priority was given to the intensification of political dialogue at the highest level. Regular consultations, an innovative approach to discussing problems, as well as the inclusion of new issues into the agenda should become the indicators of the political dialogue as a new format.

 

The next priority in the Strategy is human rights, rule of law, and democratization. These are typical European values, and the EU plans to expand its “space of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law” in new regions. The EU intends to establish a dialogue on human rights with each country in the region. That intention has already been implemented in practice. However, the experience of such dialogues, especially with Uzbekistan, has shown that the EU rhetoric often remains unheard.

 

Implementation of the third priority area is certainly commendable; however, the investment in youth and education in recent years has largely concentrated on breaking the old system and introducing the mechanisms of the Bologna education process. Any efforts in this direction would be complicated, given the disastrous situation with our educational system, plight of the teaching staff, and lack of motivation among today's young people. Achieving effective and successful results in this area requires a major educational reform and substantial donor financial support.

 

The fourth area of the EU attention is economic development, trade and investment. Here, even the proposal of the EU system in favoring the countries of Central Asia is unlikely to change the huge trade deficit between the two regions to benefit Central Asia. The European market saturated with the goods of own its production and the EU protectionist policies against the imports of agricultural products, which the Central Asian region is famous for, pose serious barriers to trade between the regions.

 

The fifth area of priorities for the EU is the strengthening of energy and transportation channels. It is the highest priority among the EU’s real interests in cooperation with Central Asia. Under the initiative of energy security, there is a hidden EU intention to diversify energy supply from Central Asia, especially the Caspian basin, to European markets, thus reducing the EU energy dependency on Russia. Unfortunately, these issues are too closely linked to geopolitical processes that will unlikely result in the constructive dialogue on energy between the EU and Central Asia.

 

The sixth priority is the environment and water resources. In principle, it contains a good proposal for Central Asia; in particular, the integrated water resources management policy. Mutually beneficial implementation of the proposal, as well as the creation of a common energy system, might overcome several obstacles to the effective integration of the region. However, considerable disagreement between the countries of the region and the absence of a common approach to this issue does not allow for moving in that direction.

 

The seventh scope of priorities - combating common threats and challenges – is, perhaps, the most important for Central Asia. The settlement of border disputes, the joint struggle against extremism and drug trafficking, and the general security in the region, are necessary for the economic prosperity of the Central Asian countries. A stable Central Asia is beneficial for the European Union. At the same time, it is clear that for effective involvement in the region, the EU must work with regional security organizations, (e.g. the SCO and the CSTO) with which the EU has no formal relations.

 

One major drawback of the Strategy is the absence of a requirement to demonstrate practical results. Therefore, the publication in June 2008 of the Assessment Report on the Implementation of the Strategy, elaborated jointly by the European Council and the European Commission, was well expected. A comparative review of the Strategy and the report reveals some interesting observations.

---

 

 

Priority	Strategy priorities	Activities in the Report
I	Intensive political dialogue	Regional meetings in the format of the EU Troika and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries of Central Asia in Berlin and Ashgabat (continuation of the so-called “Bishkek process”); exchange of visits at the highest level; meeting of national coordinators for the implementation of the Strategy in Brussels
II	Human rights, rule of law and democratization	The European Initiative for the rule of law in Central Asia; initiated individual dialogues on human rights in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
III	Youth and education	The European educational initiative for Central Asia is being worked out; the work to establish a regional research and education network based on the Virtual Silk Road project, supported by NATO, has started
IV	Economic development, trade and investment	The Investment Program for Central Asia has begun in November 2007; negotiations on Kazakhstan's accession to WTO continue
V	Energy and Transportation	INOGATE and TRACECA remain the major mechanisms of the European Union influence in this area
VI	Environment and Water Resources	Environmental cooperation is underway with: the Dialogue between the EU  and CA  and the Water Working Group between the EU –and CA; national dialogues on water policy are being conducted; a conference on water management was held in Berlin
VII	Facing common threats and challenges	First Security Forum with the EU-Central Asia in Paris; ongoing regional projects BOMCA and CADAP

 

 

The above table shows that the European institutions have been doing much to intensify the efforts to strengthen the partnership with Central Asia. Apparently, the main focus this year was made on the institutionalization of relations: the “Bishkek process” keeps on operating; for the first time, the national coordinators on implementation of the Strategy and Security Forum the EU-Central Asia have met. In virtually every priority of the Strategy, the profile dialogues or appropriate measures have been initiated; the results of which are too early to see. However, there is an obvious need in fresh ideas, particularly in the field of energy and transportation, because the current regional conflicts do not allow existing European initiatives to be fully implemented.

 

“TWO-WAY STREET"

 

In this context, more practical measures from the side of Kyrgyzstan are required to effectively implement the goals of the EU Strategy. Despite the fact that the Strategy is no more than a declaration of intent, the document is of great political significance.  It demonstrates the increased interest of the European Union in Central Asia and represents a unique frame for resolving regional problems. In this sense, the Strategy offers another opportunity for countries in the region to strengthen their partnership with the EU and begin the process of regional integration. Kyrgyzstan, in this context, could concentrate its efforts on the following:

 

1. In response to the Strategy, Kyrgyzstan could elaborate a national strategy of partnership with the EU or a more practical plan of action to implement the PCA between the EU and Kyrgyzstan. The agreement provides the basic legal framework for cooperation with the EU, and such a prolonged delay in its implementation has a negative impact on the overall state of contacts between the Kyrgyz Republic and the EU.

 

2. Further development of the Institute of National Coordinator for the implementation of the Strategy with the emphasis on overall coordination of cooperation with the European Union, including donor and financial flows is needed. The division of spheres of the EU cooperation with Kyrgyzstan in various departments without central coordination often leads to poorer results and overlap. In this regard, the appointment of a special representative or coordinator (with an office) for European affairs is necessary (in response to the introduction of the EU special representative for Central Asia in 2005).

 

3. Regional consultations between the Central Asian countries on cooperation with the EU. Such a format could be a constructive basis for regional integration and the attempts to start negotiations on the establishment of unified energy and water networks in Central Asia. Such consultations could be inspired by the example of the EU, where the original “six” formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 with the aim of sharing their coal reserves and steel industries to revive the economy in the postwar period.

 

4. Focus on practical results should be a constant for the Kyrgyz-European cooperation. The emergence of new initiatives, particularly in the field of water resources and education, gives some hope for progress, but, at the same time, it causes the concern because of the low effectiveness of current EU projects in the region. In particular, an expensive BOMCA project allowed for updating or building new checkpoints at the internal borders in Central Asia.  However, the lack of effective monitoring mechanisms does not guarantee the proper use of this project.

 

Obviously, the Strategy will yield its results when those, who actually should benefit from this strategy, will work more actively, and when cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the EU will work in the regime of a “two-way street”. Some might say that the Europeans, with their Strategy, have driven us into a strict framework and now instruct us on how to deal with regional problems. But, if we ourselves cannot solve them, why not accept a helping hand?

 

We constantly say that the European model of integration is a model for similar processes in Central Asia. However, within the framework of the so-called “Bishkek process”, the EU is trying to bring all the Central Asian states to the negotiation table.  If we all start with saying that each country is unique and requires a differentiated approach, and if the EU tries to use an individual approach, the competition among Central Asian countries begins. It is rather a vicious circle, not the integration based on mutual concessions and consensus for the common good. It is, therefore, not surprising that the EU Strategy now has a new dual approach to Central Asia, combining the principles of differentiation and individuality.

 

The partnership potential between Kyrgyzstan (and Central Asia) with the EU is huge.  But the traditional Kyrgyz view of the EU as a generous donor, not as an equal partner, shifts all the focus and balance. A change of such a view, an in-depth knowledge of European institutionalism and a clarity of specific goals corresponding to the national interests of the country, can finally help us progress in the cooperation with the EU.

 

In terms of economic and political transition in the region, an optimal way out could be found in mutual support. The European Union is a good example of how the countries of one region could put aside their differences and ambitions for absolute leadership and create a common space for the future generations.

 

Joomart Ormonbekov, PhD Candidate in Political Science, MGIMO-University

 

[1] For more details on the EU technical aid to Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia see: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/country-cooperation/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan_en.htm 

[2] Despite the comparatively moderate EU position in this issue, the European Parliament managed to adopt a tough resolution concerning the situation in Uzbekistan (October 26, 2006. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2006-0467+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN)