IPP offers readers an article by Muratbek Imanaliev, the president of the Institute for Public Policy, on the Kyrgyz-US relations at its current stage.

The first and main question is "How do we position each other within our own state policies, public opinion and understanding of the interests of each other?" Objective determination of the places occupied by the two countries in the world politics and economy, is as follows: USA and Kyrgyzstan are at opposite poles. The United States is the first power of the world in all respects, while Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest countries on the planet. Besides, the countries are not in the same system of operating coordinates. I speak primarily about values and priorities, of course, excluding declarations.

On the other hand, it is obvious that Washington, along with a very small number of the leading countries, forms the main vectors and sites of global politics and economy, to which Bishkek has to integrate into them; if it is able to do so. Even today, Kyrgyzstan builds its foreign policies based not on its national interests, but on mercantilization of the choice and the likelihood of its change.  Very often, the mechanism of the choice is quite simple, on the level of individual, family, clan or other group preferences. Only the following conclusion is apparent: In most cases, the choice taken is merely a practice of spontaneity and an inadequate reaction to the signals (sometimes false) coming from the powerful.

It might seem that the international law, a specific embodiment of which is, for example, the UN, makes the chances of all countries equal. Within the framework of the UN, each country has not only the right to vote, but also has the right to put forward some initiatives, such as preventive protection of national interests. However, the system and rules of the UN Security Council, as well other parameters and requirements, functions to create a hierarchy of states, depending on their political, economic and even geographic significance. The hierarchy provides a list of "rights and duties" for each. For example, weak states may not violate the principles and the norms of international law, as punishment is unavoidable.

In this context, Kyrgyz-US relations are not the interaction of the above-mentioned "value-filled spaces," at least, because of the fact that it is hard to talk about a well-developed national system of values in Kyrgyzstan. That is why the history of Soviet-American relations (where our country indirectly participated), as well as the historically controversial image of the US (modeled in the Soviet times, as a country with enormous wealth acquired by unjust labor and hard exploitation of people), still serve as a pseudo-value guide for Kyrgyzstan, in their understanding of America. Despite that we would like to use US wealth, and in fact, we sometimes do so. It should also be noted that this is relevant to both liberals, that is "Westerners," and also to those who do not consider themselves liberals (i.e., those who identify themselves with the opponents of the West). The story of "democracy island" is a confirmation of it. The successor of the Soviet-American relations in the above-proposed sense, though fragmentary, is now the Russian-American relations. I would like to point out that these relations form both the "for" and "against" positions in the development of the relations with the West among the Kyrgyz elite and the public in general. A special note here is the fact that Kyrgyzstan is located in the zone of the Russian information influence. It should also be emphasized that US relations with our neighbors (Uzbek-American, Kazakh-American or Chinese-American), do not affect the formation of Kyrgyz-US relations (except some insignificant nuances). However, there is some mild understanding that the Russian-American relations cannot serve as a source of building Kyrgyz-US relations. Russian-American relations is only a factor of influence, which the Kyrgyz leadership cannot ignore; although sometimes it tries to do so.

Let's try to analyze the interests of the United States and Kyrgyzstan. "In general, US interests in Central Asia today are very vague. They have not been determined or discussed seriously," says the director of Russian and Asian programs of the American Institute of World Security Nikolai Zlobin. "I think there are still intelligence battles, collection of information and licking the wounds after the first failures. Secondly,  there is a desire not to let anyone monopolize Central Asia. Today neither Russia nor China want this. And the United States understand that such monopolization would be an additional responsibility, which the administration of George W. Bush does not want to bear. Therefore, America would continue to support healthy competition in Central Asia, but again, neither China nor Russia support this." (1)

Nevertheless, other experts see obvious goals of the Americans in Central Asia behind this "vagueness." Oleg Reut believes that they are: 1. forming pro-American orientation of the region; 2. restraining the influence of China and Russia and creating conditions for an open clash of interests of Russia and China; 3. using the regional capacity to build long-term dialogue with the Islamic world. (2)

Arguing about American interests in the region, we should not forget about the project called the "Great Central Asia," which, if accepted by the U.S. administration, is a tool for achieving the ambitious objectives of this project.

But to date, the most important development is the position of the new U.S. President, Barack Obama, who came to power promising radical changes, including changes in the foreign policy of the country. Of course, the main objectives of its policy in Afghanistan, repeatedly claimed by Obama, have drawn attention. Apparently, Washington did not imply serious policy changes regarding the vast Islamic region from Maghreb to the Jungar Gates; only one of the focuses of the American foreign policy in the region shifts dramatically.

However, if the pre-election intention of Obama regarding Afghanistan will be implemented during his presidency, Kyrgyzstan will be in the "focal point" of the "Afghan reconstruction" by the new American President. Similarly, so will other Central Asian States. And in this sense, Kyrgyzstan has some, although not comprehensive, advantage over its neighbors. What  I am referring to, of course, is the American airbase located on the territory of the Kyrgyz airport "Manas." There is no other airbase in the region. However, this advantage may turn into nothing if the airbase is dismantled and moved, for example, to a neighboring country.

The above-mentioned interests and objectives of the United States are classified as regional. Obviously, the achievement of these objectives requires formulation of the country's interests and interaction from Washington; taking into account the importance and potential of each of the states of Central Asia. There is no need to describe all the countries of the region from this point of view. All was said a long time ago.

During these seventeen years of Kyrgyz-American relations, the status of Kyrgyzstan, from the perspective of American foreign policy, has changed from being the "democracy island" - a showcase of possible Central Asian liberal development, created by the West and especially the U.S., - to an ally in the anti-terrorist coalition; or more accurately, in military American operations in Afghanistan.

(Many of my colleagues do not agree with the term "ally," and prefer to offer, what they believe to be,  a more neutral term: "partner." But how else should one perceive the actions of Kyrgyzstan who offered its territory for U.S. military base and thus almost directly got involved in military operations in Afghanistan? Isn't that an "alliance"?

One should bear in mind the prevailing justification, at its time, for the opening of the base.  It was a military and political, rather than commercial, justification. The territory and services were presented to the Americans practically free by the Kyrgyz government. Let me remind you also about the existence of the base before 2005 in Uzbekistan - "Karshi-Khanabad." In 2001, Tashkent almost openly declared its "alliance" with the U.S.; though not actually using the term.

The interests of Kyrgyzstan and, accordingly, its policy with respect to the U.S. during the years of independence have not gone beyond the corridor of commercial preferences. Kyrgyzstan did not formulate any thoughtful political, economic or other interests. The intentions of economic cooperation, attracting U.S. investments and all other similar intentions disguised a spontaneous desire to use the U.S. as a new "subvention" center. The United States actively supported democratic choices of Kyrgyzstan, personified by the image and actions taken by the ex-President A. Akaev. Apparently, the entry of our country into the WTO was also an action of support. The decision was more political, although one should recognize the achievements of Bishkek in the establishment and strengthening of market economy.

American assistance was also obvious in Kyrgyzstan's cooperation with the IMF, World Bank and other international economic and financial institutions. (In connection with the latter, I would like to say once again that the main problem of the failure of working with the IMF was, in my view, the lack of a strictly constructed system of values and national interests. To prove my words, I will bring the example of South Korea and other Asian countries, which also actively cooperated with this organization and achieved impressive success).

Of course, I should mention the grant aid, provided to Kyrgyzstan by Americans. The total amount during seventeen years has been approximately one billion one hundred million dollars.

However, this artificial "democracy island" was destroyed, and not only by the efforts of the President A. Akaev and his team, but also with the help of the West. This is obvious. The West let the President of Kyrgyzstan and some opposition leaders turn democracy into commerce; into an instrument of profit.

I have another relevant note. While it was possible to try to understand the support (and not only political) for opposition leaders and organizations, which, unfortunately, did not happen, such statements by many American politicians, diplomats and experts as "You are good guys - democrats, but the authoritarian Uzbekistan is more important for us" were perceived by the political circles of Kyrgyzstan very painfully. In the1990s, this was accompanied by tougher criticism of the leadership of Kyrgyzstan (than our neighbors) on the part of governments and human rights organizations of the West, especially the U.S., for the shortcomings in the development and strengthening of democracy. This approach to "democratization" of Kyrgyzstan brought liberals from our country into a state of shock and confusion, to the great delight of their opponents. The result was disappointment. It is important to note that in the Kyrgyz relations with Russia and other countries, this element of criticism was excluded; which was a very favorable factor not only for a student- politician.

Today we cannot talk about any full-fledged relations between Kyrgyzstan and the U.S.

Democracy, as a possible format and the meaning of the relations between Kyrgyzstan and the United States, went into nothingness. Restoration is questionable, although even today our country is the only Central Asian republic, which remains within the democratic transit. Perhaps, with a new global wave of democratization in the foreseeable future, which is sure to happen, new opportunities for the Kyrgyz-American relations will arise in this context.

So far, economy and trade do not serve as a factor or basis for interaction between our countries. American economic presence in Kyrgyzstan is insignificant and is unlikely to increase in the near future. It is unlikely that American businessmen, who may come to our country, will be able to compete, for example, with the Chinese businessmen, who have strengthened their position not only in Kyrgyzstan, but in the whole region of Central Asia.

Culture and education could be the basis for Kyrgyz-American relations. The American University in Central Asia, opened with the support of the U.S. government, and the Open Society Institute are gradually turning into ordinary Kyrgyz educational institutions. Unfortunately, the Governments of both countries pay no attention to it, and it is not a subject of negotiations between them; although it could have become a center of American culture and education not only in Kyrgyzstan.

Afghanistan is number one security problem in Central Asia.  The Central Asian states so far have focused on two initiatives concerning this problem. The first is Tashkent's proposal to re-establish a kind of consulting group, however, in an expanded format at the expense of NATO (the so-called "6+3") and try to unite the world surrounding Afghanistan. The second proposal actually, was not an initiative of the region; the SCO, whose members are Central Asian States, proposed it. The initiative is about the creation of a SCO group on Afghanistan and holding a conference on the situation in that country. As for the rest, which is the most important, the countries of Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan, delegated the decision of the Afghan issue to the leading powers, especially the United States and NATO. Since Bishkek (as well as its neighbors) is not so much concerned about the Afghan issue (although it must be concerned), the negotiations on the airbase in the "Manas" airport have a very strange agenda, which will be described further. It looks like the security issues are, in fact, outside the Kyrgyz-American dialogue, which does not exist either.

The mosaic description of the main blocks of cooperation, in my opinion, confirms the idea that there are no real full-fledged relations of Kyrgyzstan with the U.S. So what is the bottom line?

The bottom line is the factors affecting the formation of certain understanding on how to communicate with the U.S. administration; and nothing more. These factors are of direct and indirect actions. One of them has already been mentioned - the Russian-American relations. The activities of regional and international organizations, to which Kyrgyzstan is party to, first of all the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), are also among these factors. For Washington, the most important factors involve how the relations between Russia and China in this organization will develop; what will be the level and scope of consolidation on the basis of anti-Americanism between the leading countries of the organization; and how it will affect the other parties - specifically, what areas of military and economic activities of the SCO will develop? Finally, how and when will the basic objectives and tasks of the organization be reformatted? It is obvious that development of the view (not positions!) of some small member countries of the SCO, including Kyrgyzstan, on the relations with America will largely depend on that.

The above can be described as a political-orientation factor.

Another important factor for Kyrgyzstan is the cooperation with international economic and financial organizations, primarily the IMF and the WB. Cooperation is especially needed at the current moment during a deepening global financial crisis which has already demonstrated its reflection in other aspects of life. We know that Bishkek clearly understands what Washington's influence in these organizations is. Another point is also clear: Kyrgyzstan's cooperation with the IMF and the WB, as well as with other international organizations, will last more than one year. And all this time, maintaining relations with them, Bishkek will have to bear in mind the significance of the American factor. Unfortunately, today our country cannot stop working with these organizations or replace them with others. And it means that we need to learn how to work with them, strictly protecting our interests.

The same factor includes the problem of the state debt, the bulk of which goes to the IMF and the WB. Cancellation or restructuring of the debt depends on the position of the donor countries. Actually, the absolute amount of the debt is not that large. However, since there is no development, its virtual amount is increasing, and the pressure on our economy is growing, especially psychological pressure. I would like to emphasize that there are a lot of countries in the world where public debt per capita is much higher than in Kyrgyzstan, but economic development is gradually reducing this virtual burden and, ultimately, the real pressure on economy. To solve this problem of debt, we need not only to cooperate with the United States, the IMF and the WB, but also really develop our economy.

Summing up, I would like to mention the program "Millennium Challenge Account," initiated by the U.S. government. As you know, Kyrgyzstan is a so-called "threshold country" (i.e., a country that should be a direct recipient of donor aid under this program). The grant assistance by the U.S. government, provided by Washington for seventeen years, is also a part of this program.

Taken together, all the above-mentioned factors, associated with international financial organizations, donor programs and grants, are financial and political factors.

And, finally, the factor of the airbase "Manas" should be considered separately. I have mentioned that the agenda of the talks between Kyrgyzstan and the U.S. on the airbase "Manas" seems very strange, at first glance. This is because during the talks, the parties did discuss the interaction between Bishkek and Washington on the problem of Afghanistan, including the current situation in this country, nor the prospects for its development and possible partnership. Instead, they discussed the cost of rent. In this case, speaking about skillful diplomatic actions of Kyrgyzstan, which is trying to make a contribution to resolving the situation in Afghanistan, is absolutely senseless. It is a very simple phenomenon - commercialization of the relations. Now this problem has occurred once again, and it is closely connected with the Russian loan. Again politicians, experts and ordinary people try to guess if it is just bargaining or Kyrgyzstan is really ready to liquidate the airbase? And again there has not been even a single word about Afghanistan. That is why the airbase should be seen as a factor, not as cooperation between the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan.

The population of Kyrgyzstan should understand that the "Manas" airbase is a complex military-political internationalized structure; at least, for our country. At different levels of this structure, there are different groups of problems and different countries. The interests of different agencies of the United States, Russia and China have clashed at one of the top levels. The problem of Afghanistan, which should be solved, is at another level. At the third level, there are the interests of the countries located to the south of Kyrgyzstan.  These countries understand that an American airbase in Kyrgyzstan (and not only that) can be considered a sudden threat. And so on. All this structure is actually connected with the interests of Kyrgyzstan, and not just rent.

And finally, there is a personal factor. It is complex and sometimes unpredictable. And it plays an important role in politics, not always negative.

So, do we need each other? Are we able to use the factors described in this article in building good relations with each other? The question is not rhetorical. But the answer must be found.

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1. Nikolai Zlobin. "Interes k osvoeniu aziatksih territorii u Soedinennyh Shtatov segodnya nizok" [The United States' interest in the development of the Asian territories is low today]. www.centrasia.ru 14/09/08

2. O. Reut. U.S. "Interesy SHA - ot soprovojdenia k upravleniu?" [The interests of the USA - from accompanying to management?]

09/10/08