The fact that Uzbekistan's relations with its other neighbors are not friendly either is unlikely to satisfy us. This is a problem of Uzbekistan, and it is not our current aim to judge Uzbekistan's Central Asian policy. Suffice to say, it is with regret that this country, located in the heart of Central Asia and by this very fact destined to become a unifying regional center, in reality has never participated in any attempts to form a regional context.

We are talking neither about regional nostalgia, nor about Uzbekistan. First, we have to deal with our own foreign policy, including relations with our neighbor, which we cannot get rid of, because of geographical proximity; unlike, for example, the American or the Russian "neighborhood."

Regardless of how adequate the Kyrgyz official foreign policy strategy is, we have our own objective national interests, and they dictate our positions, aims and the logic of actions concerning the problems existing in our neighborhood. We cannot ignore, without any consequences, the fact that we are not satisfied with the situation in the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border area or with the lack of partnership or any productive relations with this neighboring country.

Of course, we can (and we often do this) refer to the cultural and civilizational gap, which exists between our peoples. The Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks clearly belong to different worlds. Settled and nomadic way of livelihood, agricultural and cattle-farming management schemes, network and hierarchical ways of social organization - all these form differences not only in life models, but also in cultural attitudes, value systems and ontological pictures of the two peoples.

Nevertheless, very different nations often share common borders. The Ferghana Valley is not the only place on Earth where this happens. The lines and areas of cultural and civilizational fault exist almost everywhere in the world; even in such a seemingly monolithic region, as Europe. Nations can very well co-exist there.

The problem, rather, is our own.

First of all, it is necessary to answer the question: what does Uzbekistan, and the relations with it, mean to our country?

There are many factors that require giving Uzbekistan a key position in our foreign policy strategy. Here are some of them:

Uzbekistan is almost one of the only countries, providing the Kyrgyz Republic with the most important energy resource: natural gas. And we must note that Uzbekistan has supplied and keeps on supplying natural gas this year at prices that are substantially lower than the market price. Those who look at our western neighbor with antipathy should be aware of the significance of this fact. I think this is much more important for our economy and social well-being than other problems such as the Uzbek border regime, which we have learned to easily overcome.

Uzbekistan is a key channel through which we could receive Turkmen gas and Iranian gasoline, if we had cared enough about our national energy security and independence and decided to diversify our supply of raw materials.

The most important transport communications, linking the Kyrgyz Republic with the southern Caspian Sea, Middle East, Turkey and Europe, go through Uzbekistan. This branch of the Silk Road is used today only by car dealers, supplying vehicles from the United Arab Emirates. There is no other chance for Kyrgyzstan to be on the way from China to Europe, except through the railroad from Kashgar through Uzbekistan.

For the southern provinces of our country, Uzbekistan is a transit country in their communications with Kazakhstan and Russia; especially the railway.

Due to our own sluggishness we, unfortunately, cannot develop air routes, while Uzbekistan already has its own more developed network of air routes that are more convenient to use than the Almaty ones; provided that there is a sufficient number of flights from Bishkek and local airports in the South of Kyrgyzstan to Tashkent.

Because of existing territorial economic systems, the Uzbek provinces, adjacent to the Kyrgyz border, have close business relations with the Kyrgyz South. Border trade is cheaper than our internal inter-provincial trade, especially when it comes to the north and south. Uzbek provinces, not Bishkek, are the major markets for many types of products produced in the Kyrgyz south. The whole of Kyrgyzstan uses Uzbek fertilizers (if it uses fertilizers at all). Today, only the Uzbek fruits and vegetables are still able to compete with the Chinese ones at the Bishkek market; especially in early spring. No administrative actions or restrictions on either side can break these economic ties because they are necessary for the existence of millions of people in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Imagine what will happen if the Uzbek entrepreneurs no longer leave millions of dollars daily at the markets of Kyrgyzstan.

A particularly serious issue in the relations with Uzbekistan is the water problem. We have often said, and rightly so, that our water is the property of the Kyrgyz people; of our country. But we should not forget that only our direct neighbors can to buy this water from us. The project of transporting water to other regions is no more than a fantasy. We do not yet have any other buyers for water, except, first and foremost, Uzbekistan, as well as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Therefore, the Uzbek consumers of water are as important to us as the water itself. Without them, the water running out of our country is of no use for us. The current policy of threats leads to the fact that every year, their dependence on Kyrgyz water is decreasing. Being threatened with low supplies of water, any sensible government would think about how to do without this water; or, how to deprive the water supplying country from its right to dispose of the water at its own discretion. Islam Karimov is, undoubtedly, a sensible leader.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan Vladimir Norov, spoke at a meeting of the OSCE Council of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs on 5 December, 2008, in Helsinki.  He said to the world community that, "Currently, the largest hydropower constructions of the region (Toktogul Hydropower station in Kyrgyzstan, Kayrakum and Nurek hydropower stations in Tajikistan),  initially built primarily for irrigation purposes, has shifted to the energy mode of work. As a result, increased water releases in winter have caused flooding of useful territories, destruction of houses and other emergency situations; the damage from which amounts to hundreds of millions US dollars. The work of water reservoirs in the regime of water accumulation during the summer period has resulted in the shortage of water resources for agricultural production. This has caused a reduction of cultivated areas and crop yields and, consequently, the deterioration of living conditions for the population and even conflict situations. The flora and fauna of the river basin ecosystem suffer from the change in the water content." He pointed out that,  "The up-river countries - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - without any environmental impact assessment and coordination with its neighbors, developed new large-scale construction projects for hydropower stations in the upper Amu Darya, Syr Darya and Zaravshan in addition to the Kambarata hydropower station in Kyrgyzstan, and the Yavans and Rogun hydroelectric power stations in Tajikistan."

According to the basic requirements of the UN conventions, all decisions on the use of waterflow of transboundary rivers, including the construction of hydropower facilities, must in no way damage the environment and infringe upon the interests of the countries in the neighboring territories. Two extremely important conditions must be guaranteed. The first: reduction of the watercourse for the down-river countries must not be allowed. The second: environmental balance of the region, which is already very unstable, should not be violated. In the event of damage, all measures to eliminate or reduce such damage must be taken and, if necessary, the question of compensation must be raised.

"We are convinced that these requirements should be mandatory in implementing various projects on building hydropower facilities in Central Asia by both national and transnational companies, including international financial institutions, wishing to participate in such projects," concluded the Minister, during his speech. These ideas were expressed once again by the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov and recorded in the final communiqué on the visit of the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev to Uzbekistan.

Thus, if the policy pursued by the Uzbek leadership prevails, then, in conjunction with the intentions of the Kyrgyz leadership to "very firmly" bind itself with the Russian promises to invest in hydropower construction on the Naryn river, we will find ourselves in a situation where Kyrgyzstan will not be able to take decisions on the use of its own water. Opposition protest against the privatization of energy sector and its fears of losing control over private water-use will seem to us children's fears, compared with the control over this water by other States, which is most likely to happen.

But, perhaps, the most important factor that compels us to treat Uzbekistan as one of the main foreign partners of the Kyrgyz Republic is the demographic situation in the South of our country. As a result of internal migration from the southern provinces to the North, predominantly to Bishkek, as well as two external migration directions: from Kyrgyzstan to Russia and from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan, the Uzbek population today constitutes not statistical, but actual majority in the border areas.

And we must bear in mind that the bulk of them are citizens of Kyrgyzstan. Given a real ethnic policy in the Kyrgyz Republic, this part of the population finds itself in a position of national minority, not in the European, privileged, sense of this word, but in our, pejorative sense. This applies not only to language issues; although they have not been resolved, as the Uzbek population wished. And it is not only about equal conditions in business, which of course, do not exist either. First and foremost, this relates to the civil status of this ethnic group. Unequal, as compared to the Kyrgyz people, opportunities to participate in government and even in local government, the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion often concerning the ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan force them to look at neighboring Uzbekistan and even cause separatist sentiments among them. We don't know today how many ethnic Uzbeks who are citizens of Kyrgyzstan have, at the same time, passports of the neighboring country. Anyway, among the reasons which lay behind the position of Kyrgyzstan during the Russian-Georgian conflict, there were undoubtedly, fears of a hypothetical possibility of Uzbekistan using the same Russian logic for the invasion into the territory of Georgia, to settle the water conflict between our two countries.

In adddition, no one knows today how many Uzbek migrants live and work in the Kyrgyz South. The "rawest" estimates show that entire settlements, vacated after the departure of the Kyrgyz population, are now populated by newcomers from Uzbekistan. And they settle not for lease or for temporarily. The houses have been bought and refurbished with large investments of money, and, new bakeries and hairdressing shops have been opened. Such towns, such as Kochkor-Ata, which previously were typically "Kyrgyz," are now populated by the Uzbeks. The causes of this "creeping" migration are understandable, but the problem is not getting any easier.

Once we initiated the preparation of a special report, which was titled (not even symbolically) "Lost South." It was made by well-known experts, Toktogul Kakchekeyev and Nur Omarov, and presented to the public. So far, the State authorities have no clear idea or a well-built policy regarding the South. Instead of taking advantage of the Uzbek neighborhood and of the potential partnership with this neighboring country to make Fergana a zone of economic growth and consolidation of the Kyrgyz population here, we have to deal with many problems and face a situation comparable with Uzengu-Kuush, seems absolutely insignificant.

The chances of turning the South of the country into a zone of active and fast economic growth are not mythical. Uzbekistan is a huge market, which, even under the current artificially restricted conditions, pulls out of Kyrgyzstan a mass of commodities, greatly exceeding our production. Last year it was just enough to see how intensively Kyrgyz flour, sugar and vegetable oil were sold to Uzbekistan. Moreover, through Kyrgyzstan and thanks to the efforts of our businessmen, caravans of Chinese flour and other commodities were exported to Uzbekistan.

And this is not all. Uzbekistan can open for our country the doors in the South and South-West: to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan and the Caucasus. Ferghana Valley could have become one of the special economic zones, whose creation was anticipated within the framework of SCO, a kind of giant Central Asian economic hub.  It could have become so, but of yet, has not. The region, which is extremely rich, and historically has always been a place of concentration of the largest capital and assets, today leads a miserable existence- losing its population and its economic potential. Instead, it is gaining in potential for conflicts over border, water, land and for drug trafficking.

A serious foreign policy strategy problem facing the Kyrgyz Republic is the question of the borders with Uzbekistan. Kyrgyz sovereignty can be regarded as fact only when the formation of its territorial contour is completed. However, this can only happen when the issue with the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border is resolved. The Kyrgyz-Tajik border demarcation does not create critical conditions for the existence of the Kyrgyz nation, unlike the problem of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Without any exaggeration, the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border problem determines the territorial integrity and completeness of the Kyrgyz state.

Relations with Uzbekistan have great importance also in another respect. As a nation, not possessing great foreign policy potential, the Kyrgyz Republic forms its foreign policy status by positioning itself towards other states; first and foremost to those that are subjects in regional or global politics. Uzbekistan is, of course, one of such countries, and relations with it can provide us with strategic support, when it comes to relations with traditional geopolitical centers of power: Russia, China, the United States.

There exists a choice: either we will be able to use the relations with Uzbekistan to strengthen our positions in different issues and situations, as it has happened for example, in the "forced recognition" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, or on the contrary: our relations with Uzbekistan will be used by other countries for their own interests.

In this regard, we can say that Kyrgyzstan, whether we want it or not, is dependent on other countries' attitudes toward Uzbekistan. Suffice it to recall, the question of a Russian base in southern Kyrgyzstan, which of course, would have been intended not to fight terrorists on the Kyrgyz territory, as a component of Russia's control over Uzbekistan and its pressure on this country. After the Andijan events and Uzbekistan's orientation to Russia, this issue was no longer relevant, but now some Russian and pro-Russian experts again return to it.

The problems in the relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have been actively used in regional political games. The meeting in Borovoye and the story of the Kyrgyz-Russian agreement on energy demonstrated it very well. Kyrgyzstan is being skillfully moved to confrontation with Uzbekistan. In conjunction with the intent to deprive the Kyrgyz Republic of the American umbrella in the form of anti-terrorist coalition base in Manas, which, in its time, strengthened the position of Kyrgyzstan in the Kyrgyz-Uzbek water-gas "war," there appears a suspicion that now we are being moved to the phase of new Kyrgyz-Uzbek contradictions. Interestingly enough in this context, the Chinese side is not not raising the issue of the American base, although previously it caused the greatest concern among the Chinese.

Given the importance of relations with Uzbekistan and the real state of these relations in the foreign policy of the Kyrgyz Republic, the position of the Kyrgyz authorities in this regard are at least puzzling.

Let's start with the fact that we know Uzbekistan well, it being our closest neighbor for many centuries; in comparison, we know much less than about Europe, the U.S., and Japan. Of course, the Uzbek information space is quite specific; but neighboring countries have many opportunities to know each other much better than we do today. Materials on the situation in Uzbekistan are rare even in the Kyrgyz media, not to mention expert analyses and opinions.

The communication with politicians, experts, officials, science and culture activists of this neighboring country has been extremely reduced. Many Kyrgyz citizens today remember their friends in Uzbekistan only from the Soviet times. The experience of those who had worked in Uzbekistan as diplomats for many years, and know that country from the inside, is not being demanded.

We have no real idea of how our neighbors see our country and our politics. Of course, unpleasant sayings by the Uzbek leaders do reach us. It is clear that there is an impressive list of claims, which the Uzbek side has against us. But no one has tried to understand what they are and why they appeared; although we could have begun it. Uzbekistan has no reason to intentionally assign negatives to us and try to demonize Kyrgyzstan. We are not their competitors in the natural resources race, as, for example, Kazakhs, and Turkmens. And we are not their enemies. We do not have serious mutual historical ethno-territorial claims, as in the case with the Tajiks. We could have tried to understand the point of view of our neighbors; what they dislike, and why, and to find a joint solution.

In serious foreign policy, one cannot rely on the myths about bad Karimov who does not wish to recognize anybody, nor about the special Uzbek mentality, not allowing for negotiations. We have lived next to this mentality for many centuries. Some of the Kyrgyz have already inherited this mentality very well. Our ancestors quite easily communicated with their neighbors, as well as with many other nations; regardless of their attitudes, modes and so on. We are quite justifiably proud of our adaptability and cultural tolerance. It is impossible for us to not find a common language.

We need to build relations with Uzbekistan which are guided by our own interests and reason, rather than strange patterns and emotions. The strategy of confrontation must give way to a strategy of cooperation. Such relations have a great future.