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Bakyt Beshimov:
“Kyrgyzstan: is democracy on the agenda for the country?”
Valentin Bogatyrev:
“Status of formal political institutes and interactions with informal political structures in Kyrgyzstan”
Muratbek Imanaliev:
“Informal institutes as “rules of a political game” in Kyrgyzstan”
1. To begin with there are several retrospective fragments that could significantly influence, or have already started influencing, the process of formation of historical-philosophical, cultural-humanitarian and social-economic foundations: The mechanisms of constructing both regional and individual country-based self-identification models for the further development of Central Asia as a whole, and of each country, including the possibility to turn the region into an internationally-linked infrastructure.
Firstly, Central Asia is located at the crossroad of several cultures and civilizations: Russian, Persian, Arabic-Muslim, Chinese and Turk-Mongolian; Secondly, Central Asia is a region where all world religions are represented: Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Judaism, with a strong presence of the first two; Thirdly, Central Asia is a region which consists of three ethno-linguistic layers: Turkic, Persian and Russian. Recently there is a noticeable incorporation of Chinese and English languages into these layers. It seems that the spread of the two latter languages will become more intensive; Fourthly, Central Asia is a region of interaction and a mosaic of the mutual penetration of settled-agricultural, nomadic, social and economic types, whose influence on different aspects of life is quite strong. Yet this includes certain forms of job and professional skills, especially in the field called work psychology. Fifthly, Central Asia is a zone where the pseudo-communist ideology of the Bolsheviks, some traditional-pagan worldviews, and a nationalism with “complexeities” have been spread and which, amazingly, interact with a range of Muslim traditions among many other things.
Definitely, during the years of independence some liberal (western) concepts have been introduced. However, they were used as an instrument to earn money both by the government and opposition, and often used by all as an instrument of foreign policy maneuvering (the best example is Kyrgyzstan).
It has to be recognized that democracy as a comprehensive space with fully functional institutes is yet absent in Central Asia; Sixth, Central Asia is a place where tribal clan-based and regional relations remain major informal institutes in political and other spheres, and form a mixed behavioral background.
They play a more important role than political or economic preferences and landmarks in decision-making at the state level and not just there. It is obvious that so far these informal institutes are substituting political and legal culture. And seventh, for a long period, this region was a kind of ‘inland corridor’ (no more than this) between the countries of Asia and Europe, and at the same time a subject of different relations with nations of these two parts of the world.
The above retrospective “pictures” have an inertia type of influence, but at the same time quite seriously influence all aspects of livelihood of the Central Asian states and people, including the formation of governance systems, election procedures and processes, the legal system, economics, production relationship, social relations, self-reflection, their behavior on the international stage, and and the formation of political, intellectual and business elites, other different and persistently functioning “interest groups”, and so on. Certainly, the development and realization of internal or the foreign policy of regional countries is subjected to an often mediated influence by the same factors.
One has to note that again by inertia but still serious, these factors continue to influence the formation of the worldviews, value orientations and behavioral stereotypes of the people of Central Asian states. Obviously, all these factors have a positive and negative potential that could in one way or another influence many aspects of the livelihood of regional states including particularly the choice, awareness and persistent loyalty to internal and foreign policy preferences.
However, it is important to remember that the conflict potential of these factors may lead to the emergence of a loose, non-constructive ideological, political and spiritual atmosphere and social-economic conjuncture where people lose their political, moral-ethical landmarks.
This can create conditions for the intensification of individual and group mercantilism, national egoism, which ultimately leads to the decadence of the region. On the other hand, these factors have great potential for dynamic and large-scale advancement, but only if they’re reasonably corrected, interpreted and adequate applied within regional and national level development programs.
2. Now about the recent history of Central Asian states. Here are two most substantial extracts from the most recent history of these countries. The first: once the second most powerful state, which included the current Central Asian countries, suddenly turned into a number of poor and underdeveloped states, recipients of the West, and in this view, they competed with the great number of African and Asian client-countries. The second: because of the strategic geographical location of the region in the political map, as well as the intensification of global challenges (such as terrorism, narcotics-trafficking and other criminal activities and due to abundant resources of energy), Central Asian states have become the object of rapt attention and active policies of major centers of international military-political and economic life, primarily of the major powers.
One particular spot among the complex problems that exist in the region is the ecological interest which does not unfortunately enjoy the attention of the world community or of Central Asian countries.
In view of the above, I would like to propose the following. In the XIX century two Europeans gave two definitions that characterized the major tendencies of the most important processes of those days on the basis of historical developments in the Central Asian region. The German, von Rihtgofen wrote about the “Great Silk Road,” and the British Arthur Donnelly accurately named the politics of the major powers the “Great Game”. Recently, these two definitions are popular among politicians, scholars, experts and normal people.
I am far from extrapolating these two to the Central Asian region, but still which variant will be chosen? It is clear that the choice in most respects will depend on the regional countries. But the role of major players in world politics and economics must not be underestimated. Obviously, the choice will depend, first of all, on the results of partnerships with regional countries and those states who have interests in Central Asia.
3. The transition of Central-Asian states may and, perhaps, should be characterized as post-communism, referring to and meaning the major argument of the ‘Soviet’ origins of the region’s states. However, here I would like to note that in fact, post-communism has more relevance to Russia than to Central Asia. While talking about post-communism in our region on the basis of analysis of the current state of various groups’ worldviews, social organization (includes the social classes), value orientations of the elite groups and many other things, it is possible to extract fragments of a patriarchal system, feudalism, “wild capitalism,” primitive communism, imitations of democracy and so on.
The transition period of Central Asian states can be regarded as post-communism, but for Central Asian states it would be more precise to say that it is the epoch of “overcoming the syndrome of a sudden independence,” which is characterized by the following parameters:
1) An extreme personification of the choice of developmental model with the subsequent formation of a personality regime (or family-clan) with typical elements that range from despotism to the mild “mimicry” of authoritarianism. But, one has to note that not always and not for everything; it is the case when the leader is the only guilty one.
2) Modeling of economic development; its components represent the Soviet-type system of management, a mosaic incorporation of market mechanisms with some return to the natural economy (first of all, in rural areas), illegal privatization and personal control of a leader upon the most profitable sectors, a fragmented integration into world economic relations, etc.
3) A low level of political and legal culture (what is stronger in Central Asian countries – the law or kin? The law or a phone call?) Nor is there a balance of relations in the triad “individual-society-state.” In some of Central Asian countries, civil society as such has simply not succeeded. In the region’s states, systematic concepts and cycles such as the political and social regulation of power succession and the division of power do not function.
4) Dehumanization, and in some cases even a destruction of social relations manifested through the crisis in the family institute, a fall of education and health care levels, a more serious gap between the rural and urban, mass migration, and the criminalization of political, economic and social life in some Central Asian countries.
5) Unpredictable and not always responsible foreign policy with persistent discourse;
6) The absence of national value systems and the continuous development of emerging elites . In this view, the most important question that has to be addressed by Central Asian states is the problem of constructing self-identification models and at the same time searching for identity in the external environment. Basically, this is the question of selecting value orientations. Within the inherited and received political, socio-cultural and ideological overlapping that I tried to describe above, it is hard to choose a suitable niche for certain countries and the region as a whole which will meet the requirements of people who live in Central Asia as well as of the international community. Therefore, the problem of finding a harmonious compatibility of interests of the region’s countries and their partners is the most significant one. Is the elite being formed in Central Asian countries ready to accomplish this mission? It is a question without an answer yet. But the answer will come.
Certainly, the process of searching the major value content within the states of Central Asia is in the initial stages. In this context there are a number of proposals from outside. There are so far three sources of such proposals – the West, Islam and Russia.
China has not yet expressed itself. The statement of the meaning of this situation is quite simplified, but it is clear for everyone. According to the simplified scheme, if we visualize the structure of society pertaining to the foreign orientations of the Central Asian population as a pyramid, one can see that the major social support is given to Russia and Islam, while the West and China are not widely popular among people and do not enjoy their support. In the middle of the pyramid, the most part depends on educational, economic, cultural orientations. The possibility of a more exact estimation is complicated by the condition that the middle class in the region is still absent.
The situation of elite groups can be considered as the balance of influence of all three sources. It has to be mentioned that here we are talking about general and approximate value constructions; this is, at least, because each Central Asian country has its individual specifics. The search of value orientations and capacities in one’s own history, religion and beyond one’s historical-cultural space is often corrected and even changed in accordance with certain political preferences and a tendency to such things as the struggle for power, property, influencing the center and region, etc.
The loose and mosaic process of self-identification is burdened and strengthened by the above factors and conditions, does not encourage the completion of processes to create fully competent states in Central Asia. However, one has to recognize that the movement towards the formation of such states has started. It is slow, but happening, even though the speed of the countries is different. As for the future models of identity at the international stage, Central Asian states have two variants for development: they will join a functioning system or the one that is being formed (many depend on what will be offered from outside and how it will be presented) or they will construct their own variant of civilizational appearance.
4. Central Asia has never existed as a united geopolitical region.
The geo-economic dimension of “being a region” has always been weak, which depends on the trade-economic and transport-communication needs of the countries in the West and East. The question of Central Asia’s “being a subject” from the economic viewpoint was brought about by the existence and active economic activities of state, and semi-state, institutions within the region as well as by the aggressive or peaceful mobility of the nomads.
The Central Asian region characterized by the common cultural and humanitarian value content has never existed. The only common characteristic has been geographical proximity. The historical-geographical definition of Central Asia covers quite an extensive region: from the Urals in the north to the Himalayas in the south, from the Caspian in the west to Mongolia in the east.
This region is also known as Inner Asia. In the capacity of the united rayon, the current independent states of Central Asia emerged after the Russian-Chinese and Russian-British border delimitation in the second half of the XIX century and were named the Turkestanskiy kray. Later, during the Soviet period of the Russian Empire’s development, it was transformed into the republics of the Union. In Moscow’s State plan, these republics were known as the Middle-Asian economic region. In the military-geographical terms, they were divided and assigned into two military districts of the Soviet Union – Turkestanskiy and Middle-Asian.
The Middle-Asian republics were united into the common administrative-confessional region, and within the corresponding structure of the USSR government there was the Agency on the religions of Middle Asia. Briefly speaking, the former republics of the Union became independent in 1991 within the borders that were defined by Moscow, and the leadership of the Soviet party came to power. Thus, the current geopolitical definition of “Central Asia” has a Soviet origin.
All the above is the heritage of the region’s states, and here I would like to note that this heritage is a very important factor in the context of the co-existence of Central Asian countries that could become quite positive when transformed into the geopolitical and other values of the whole region. Whether the local elite will use this value potential or not, it is the question. This is because there are already appeals to another, not “Central Asian identity.”
Particularly, Turkmenistan tries to position itself as a Caspian and not a Central Asian state, and relations with Azerbaijan and Iran are perhaps of the primary importance, not only today but also in the near future. Kazakhstan considers itself more as an Eurasian country, and on this basis, it constructs its foreign and trade-economic priorities in Central Asia, and positions itself as the major, and even the only, bridge between Europe and Asia in the region. In view of opportunities for Tajikistan in the wake of the anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, it mostly turns to South Asia, and the establishment of the Indian airbase in Dushanbe is a kind of proof to the above.
The participation of Central Asian states in different international organizations is not a consolidating factor, but more a kind of tribute to the political fashion characterized by strong inertia. Moreover, as shown in the experience of Uzbekistan, “entering and leaving” these organizations does not charge any responsibility, and it does not result in the subsequent burdening of serious problems.
The impressive country-based projects on the formation of the “continental bridge” were not advanced and proposed to the international community by any of Central Asian countries, if we do not consider those sporadic statements of these countries’ leadership. The only exception is Kazakhstan, which proposed its Transport strategy, the Asian energy strategy and some other programs, and thereby tries to position itself as a country with special status.
5. The above thoughts have a direct relevance to the idea of formation in Central Asia of the “continental bridge” between Europe and Asia.
In this context, it is an extremely relevant question as to whether Central Asian countries can start from within coordinated actions that will benefit each country, the whole region, and certainly, the entire continent. I think that future regional constructions may have two content meanings: internal and external. The fist one (internal) is essentially the consolidation of the regional countries’ efforts to form three real images and, correspondingly perceived by the international community, of Central Asia.
I hope, no one questions that there are historically, economically and politically justified preconditions and potential to turn Central Asia into such a region. For example, the resource foundations of economy, quality and distribution of labor resources, geography, historical-cultural and humanitarian heritage and many other things forge the formation of a harmonious inter-state distribution of work that in turn could become a milestone in the integral foundations of the region’s countries.
It is believed that despite some disagreements in preliminary and loose conceptions of development of Central Asian states (proposed in the speeches of the leadership of these states and within the adopted documents), they do not contradict each other in the major points and it will not be a limitation to unite efforts. There is international support, including such programs as SPECA and CAREC.
2. Central Asia as a united battlefield with trans-border and other threats
There are, unfortunately, more and more of these threats. In this meaning, it is necessary to analyze the threats and challenges that Central Asian countries meet, to project the development of a situation, and to participate actively in preventive measures. In this regard, I find it reasonable to stress the role of the intellectual and expert communities of Central Asian countries, and their role in the advancement of these ideas.
This includes the development of science, education centers, laboratories, transport units, regional financial and trade organizations, etc. To achieve all this, it is necessary not only to consolidate efforts, but mainly to create some appropriate international structures and institutes of integration of Central Asian countries.
As other countries’ experience shows, the close integration is possible even when some quite complicated bilateral and on-going problems are present that is usually referred by the critics and those against the idea of Central Asian integration In this context, the initiative of president N.Nazarbaev to create the Central Asian Union is very important and well-timed. Of course, the proposed conception needs to be analyzed in detail and developed further along government lines and within the “second track.”
It would be useful to conduct a serious meeting of government representatives, scientists, and experts on this topic. It is known that the leadership of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has officially supported this idea. It is desirable that the president of Uzbekistan will positively perceive the proposal of the Kazakh leader.
Definitely, the position of Tashkent is extremely important in view of a number of factors, which relate not only to Uzbekistan, for example, but the condition that Uzbekistan is the only state of Central Asia that borders with all countries of the region. Some changes happening in Turkmenistan give us some ground to hope that contacts with our Turkmen friends are possible.
The second content meaning is the initiation and formation of a new historical process within Central Asia. This process must not be simply a restoration of trade-economic and transport communications, the movement of people and exchange with cultural and humanitarian values, but also the real creation of historical process taking into account the aforementioned retrospective “fragments,” the achievements of the Central Asian peoples, and with the participation of those countries and international organizations genuinely interested in the development and wellbeing of our region.
